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1. Introduction 
 
The Organization of the Islamic Conference (the “OIC”) created its 
“defamation of religions” theory to specifically protect and empower 
Islam. Rather than preventing defamation of any religion, as its name 
suggests, this theory simply maintains Islamic countries‖ rights to enact 
and enforce blasphemy, defamation, and incitement statutes that 
persecute and punish non-adherents. Since 1999, the OIC has 
                                                          
 Il contributo è pubblicato con il permesso della Brigham Young University Law 
Review - dove è apparso nel vol. n. 2 del 2010 (Tribute to Professor Michael Goldsmith), 
alle pp. 101-148) - e dell‖Autrice, che ringraziamo sentitamente. 
 
 
** Much thanks to Professor W. Cole Durham and his careful guidance and 
contribution to this work. 
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 2 
successfully drafted and ensured the passage of multiple U.N. 
resolutions encouraging member States to enact legislation prohibiting 
the defamation of religions. Though the general language has 
broadened over time to indicate protection for multiple religions, each 
of these resolutions has listed only one specific religion for protection - 
Islam.  
Though the motives behind the defamation of religions theory 
likely include an honest desire to prevent discriminatory treatment 
suffered by Muslims worldwide, the current doctrine is so broad that it 
poses a serious threat to the human right to freedom of expression. 
Thus, the U.N. should not promulgate defamation of religions 
legislation, but should instead work within the guidelines of 
established international law principles to encourage States to enforce 
religious rights, limit discrimination, and create an atmosphere of 
mutual respect. To accomplish this, the U.N. should encourage a 
narrower notion of incitement that balances regulation and even 
criminalization of speech or expression with robust discussion that 
sometimes shocks and offends.  
Suggestions that the international legal community merely adopt 
the U.S. First Amendment standards in related areas, are overtly 
imperialistic and ignore the unique histories, cultures, and experiences 
of an international jurisdiction. Instead, the U.N. should encourage 
member States to legislate more broadly than modern U.S. 
constitutional standards and allow for some limitations on speech. 
However, such limitations must be (1) specifically intended to protect 
individuals rather than beliefs or ideas and (2) narrowly defined, thus 
preventing vague and overbroad statutes that could serve as effective 
tools for governments to quash ideas with which they do not agree.  
Section II of this Article offers a brief history of the OIC as well as 
the background of and possible motivations for the defamation of 
religions resolutions in the U.N. Section III examines the history of 
defamation as a legal theory, the foundations of international human 
rights, and the question of whether defamation of religions can lead to 
permissible limitations on the human rights of expression. Section IV 
traces the evolution of the resolutions to determine if and how the 
language has changed over time and to examine whether those changes 
infringe more or less on freedoms of speech and religious expression. 
Section V analyzes the consequences of the U.N.‖s and the international 
legal community‖s acceptance of defamation of religions as a legal 
theory. Finally, in section VI, the Article suggests an alternative theory 
that strikes a better balance between ensuring the right to freely hold 
and express opinions on the one hand, and individual rights to hold 
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religious beliefs and freely practice religion in an atmosphere of civility 
and respect on the other. 
 
 
2 - History of and Motivations for the OIC Defamation of Religions 
Resolutions 
 
The promulgation of the defamation of religions resolutions began with 
the creation of the OIC and its efforts to protect Islam from defamatory 
comments and attacks by non-adherents. The September 11 terrorist 
attacks, the ensuing violence against Muslims worldwide and the 
publication of now infamous cartoons in a Danish newspaper raised the 
stakes on both sides of the already highly-charged issue. Though it is 
difficult to understand all the intricacies that motivated the OIC‖s 
promulgation of the resolutions, an examination of the history of the 
organization and its defamation of religions resolutions may provide 
important clues.  
 
2.a - The OIC Exerts a Concerted Effort to Protect Islam 
 
The OIC was established in Morocco in 1969 after Zionists attacked the 
Al-Aqsa Mosque1. Currently, its membership consists of fifty-seven 
States2: all have large Muslim populations3 and many proclaim Islam as 
                                                          
1. Permanent Mission of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, 
http://www.oic-un.org/about_oic.asp (last visited Mar. 4, 2010) [hereinafter OIC 
Website]. 
2. Id. (listing Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Benin, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Djibouti, Chad, Egypt, Cote D'Ivoire, Gabon, 
Gambia, Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, 
Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Morocco, Niger, 
Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, 
Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab 
Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen as member States). 
3. See THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUB. LIFE, GLOBAL MUSLIM POPULATION: A 
REPORT ON THE SIZE AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORLD‖S MUSLIM POPULATION 
(2009), available at http://pewforum.org/newassets/images/reports/Muslimpopula 
tion/Muslimpopulation.pdf (indicating that there is a Muslim majority in the 
population of forty-five of the member states and that there is still a substantial 
Muslim population (10% or higher) in those States where Muslims are in the minority, 
including Benin, Cameroon, Cote D‖Ivoire, Gabon, Mozambique, Togo, and Uganda). 
Interestingly, there are a few States that enjoy a large Muslim majority in terms of 
population, but are not members of the OIC, including Comoros, Mayotte, Sierra 
Leone, Kosovo and Western Sahara. Id.; OIC Website, supra note 1. 
 Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it) 
aprile 2011                                                                                                              ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
 
 4 
the state religion4. The goal of the OIC is to “safeguard the interests and 
secure the progress and well-being of their peoples and of Muslims in 
the world”5. Among other things, it aims to “safeguard [the] dignity, 
independence and national rights” of Muslims6. 
In 1999, Pakistan, acting on behalf of the OIC, submitted a draft 
resolution dealing with defamation of religions to the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights (the “Commission”)7. The resolution 
was sub-titled “Defamation of Islam” and it expressed “deep concern 
that Islam [was] frequently and wrongly associated with human rights 
violations and with terrorism”8. It also expressed concern over 
increasing intolerance of Islam and9 urged States to pass laws to 
“combat hatred, discrimination, intolerance and acts of violence, ... and 
to encourage understanding, tolerance and respect in matters relating to 
freedom of religion or belief”10. Finally, the resolution called on the 
U.N. to continue to monitor “attacks against Islam and attempts to 
defame it”11. Despite the text clearly favoring Islam over any other 
religion12 the Commission passed the resolution without a vote13. A 
similar Resolution passed in 200014, again with no vote15. The 2001 
resolution  - passed before the attacks of September 11 -  ”not[ed] with 
concern that defamation of religions [was] among the causes of social 
disharmony and [led] to violation of the human rights of their 
                                                          
4. See, e.g., The Constitution of Pakistan, Part I, 2 (“Islam shall be the State religion 
of Pakistan”); U.S. Dept. of State, Background Note: Brunei, http://www.state.gov/ 
r/pa/ei/bgn/2700.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2009) (“Islam is the official religion”); 
Constitution Of The Arab Republic of Egypt, Part I, Article 2, http://www.uam.es/ 
otroscentros/medina/egypt/egypolcon.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2009) (“Islam is the 
religion of the state ...”). 
5. OIC Website, supra note 4. 
6. Id. 
7. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ESCOR], Comm‖n on Human Rights, Pakistan, Draft 
Res. Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and all Forms of Discrimination, U.N. Doc.  
E/CN.4/1999/L.40 (Apr. 20, 1999). 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 2. 
10. Id.. 
11. Id. at 3. 
12. See id. passim. 
13. CHR Res 1999.82, at 280–81, U.N. ESCOR 55th Sess., Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1999/167 (Apr. 30, 1999). 
14. CHR Res. 2000/84 at 336–338, U.N. ESCOR, 56th Sess. Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2000/167 (Apr. 26, 2000). 
15. Id. at 338. 
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 5 
adherents”16. Facially, these early resolutions appear to be motivated by 
a desire to eliminate intimidation and coercion and strengthen 
protection for basic human rights. However, the resolution is quite 
specific in mentioning the poor treatment of Islam. After 9/11, the self-
preservation approach became even clearer.  
 
2.b - Terrorist Attacks and Danish Cartoons Raise the Stakes 
 
On September 11, 2001, terrorists connected with Islamic extremists 
hijacked four commercial airline jets and crashed three of them into 
iconic buildings in the United States: two crashed into the World Trade 
Center in New York City and one into the Pentagon in Washington, 
D.C.17. The fourth jet crashed into a rural area in Pennsylvania18. Almost 
immediately, reports of crimes against Muslims and others who were 
mistaken for Muslims noticeably increased19. In this highly charged 
atmosphere, the Commission finally called for a vote on the defamation 
of religions resolution. For the first time, the resolution passed by a 
majority vote in favor of the resolution - twenty-eight States voted in 
favor, fifteen opposed, and nine abstained20. The 2002 resolution 
expresses alarm at the impact of the events of 11 September 2001 on 
Muslim minorities and communities in some non-Muslim countries and 
the negative projection of Islam, Muslim values and traditions by the 
media as well as at the introduction and enforcement of laws that 
specifically discriminate against and target Muslims21. 
It also “[n]otes with concern the intensification of the campaign 
of defamation of religions and the ethnic and religious profiling of 
Muslim minorities in the aftermath of the tragic events of 11 September 
2001”22. Though there are general references to “religion” and 
“religions,” indicating at least some expectation that religions other 
                                                          
16. ESCOR, supra note 7 at 2. 
17. See, e.g., Michael Grunwald, Terrorists Hijack 4 Airliners, Destroy World Trade 
Center, Hit Pentagon; Hundreds Dead, WASHINGTON POST, Sep. 12, 2001, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ (last visited Mar. 4, 
2010). 
18. Id. 
19. See, e.g., Hate Crime Reports up in Wake of Terrorist Attacks, CNN, Sept. 17, 2001, 
http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/16/gen.hate.crimes/ (last visited Mar. 4, 
2010). 
20. CHR Res. 2001/4, at 47–48, U.N. ESCOR, 58th Sess., Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2001/167 (Apr. 18, 2001). 
21. ESCOR, supra note 7 at 1. 
22. Id. at 2. 
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 6 
than Islam would be included in these new protections, the document 
specifically mentions only the Islamic religion as needing protection 
and lists offenses suffered by Islam generally and its adherents 
specifically. The Commission voted to pass similar resolutions in each 
of the subsequent four years23. 
Four years later, Jyllands-Posten, a Danish newspaper, printed 
cartoons that portrayed Muhammad in a less than favorable light24. 
Islam forbids any graphic representations of Muhammad, and the 
cartoons  - which showed images of the prophet with a bomb nestled in 
his turban, and awarding virgins to martyrs - created enough 
controversy that some deemed it a global crisis25. Interestingly, the 
violence incited by the cartoons was neither instigated by non-
adherents, nor was it directed at Islam. The reactionary death threats, 
violent acts, and subsequent casualties were mostly the result of 
extremist Muslim groups reacting violently to the publication of the 
cartoons26. In the wake of these controversial cartoons and the 
subsequent violent reactions worldwide, the General Assembly of the 
U.N. took up the issue of defamation of religions and, for the first time, 
this principle organ of the U.N. debated, voted, and passed a General 
Assembly Resolution entitled “Combating Defamation of Religions”27. 
                                                          
23. CHR Res. 2005/3, U.N. ESCOR, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/L.12 (April 
12, 2005); CHR Res. 2004/6, at 28–31 U.N. ESCOR, 60th Sess., Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2004/127 (Apr. 13, 2004); CHR Res. 2003/4, at 34–37, U.N. ESCOR, 59th Sess., 
Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/135 (Apr. 14, 2003); CHR Res. 2002/9, at 56–,59, 
U.N. ESCOR, 58th Sess., Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/200 (Apr. 15, 2002). 
24. See, e.g., Muslim Anger at Danish Cartoons, BBC NEWS, Oct. 20, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4361260.stm (last visited Mar. 4, 2010). 
25. See, e.g., Mohammad Cartoons Global Crisis, BBC NEWS, Feb. 7, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4690338.stm (last viewed Mar. 4, 2010). 
26. See, e.g., Spiegel Online International, Cartoon Violence Spreads: Arson and Death 
Threats as Muhammad Caricature Controversy Escalates, SPIEGEL ONLINE INTERNATIONAL, 
Feb. 4, 2006, http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,399177,00.html (last viewed 
Mar. 4, 2010) (quoting a radical imam, “These drawings are a declaration of war,” and 
reporting that signs at demonstrations read, “Butcher those who mock Islam” and 
“Europe take some lessons from 9/11”); Mohammed Cartoons Global Crisis, supra note 
25 (detailing global demonstrations in which Muslims burned buildings and flags, 
stormed embassies, and called for the fall of Denmark); Muslim Cartoon Fury Claims 
Lives, BBC NEWS, Feb. 6, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4684652.stm 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2010); Muhammed Cartoon Row Intensifies, BBC NEWS, Feb. 1, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4670370.stm (last visited Mar. 4, 2010) (detailing 
bomb threats to publishers of the cartoons and other repercussions to European 
newspapers who reprinted the original cartoons). 
27. G.A., 60th Sess., 3d Comm., Yemen: Draft Resolution: Combating Defamation of 
Religions, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/60/L.29 (Oct. 31, 2005). 
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 7 
Considering the tenor of the times, it is no surprise that the resolution 
easily passed28.  
The cartoon controversy tightened the tension between the 
defamation resolutions and the principle of freedom of expression. On 
one side, angry Muslims demanded punishment for the insult they had 
suffered at the hands of the artists and publishers of the cartoons; on 
the other side, newspaper officials and journalists insisted that their 
right to speak their opinion could not be quashed merely because their 
views offended a religion - an idea29. Even before the controversy, the 
United States did not support the defamation of religions resolutions 
with their narrow view favoring Islam30. After the controversy, the 
United States better understood the impact the resolutions could have 
on First Amendment free speech principles and, along with other 
Western States, began to oppose the resolutions more vigorously31. 
More recently, the OIC has used the term “Islamophobia” to 
describe the discriminatory treatment suffered by Muslims worldwide. 
This discrimination is quite real and is manifest in a number of settings 
towards a variety of Muslims. Noah Feldman stated that “familiar old 
                                                          
28. There were 101 votes in favor of the resolution, and only fifty-three opposed. 
Twenty abstained from voting. 
29. See Are Protests over Cartoons Justified?, BBC NEWS, February 5, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/4678264.stm (last visited Mar. 4, 2010) 
(listing comments from across the world on both sides of the issue). 
30. U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., 3d Comm., 45th mtg. ¶ 39, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/60/SR.45 
(Nov. 21, 2005). Ms. Zach (United States of America) said that her country had been 
founded on the principle of freedom of religion. Every State must protect the right of 
its peoples to worship freely and to choose or change religions. Her delegation agreed 
with many of the general tenets of the draft resolution and deplored the denigration of 
religions. The draft resolution was incomplete, however, as it failed to address the 
situation of all religions. More inclusive language would have furthered the objective 
of promoting religious freedom. Furthermore, any resolution on the topic must 
include mention of the need to change educational systems which promoted hatred of 
particular religions or State-sponsored media which negatively targeted any one 
religion or people of a certain faith. 
31. See, e.g., HILARY RODHAM CLINTON, REMARKS ON THE RELEASE OF THE 2009 
ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Oct. 26, 2009), http:// 
www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/10/130937.htm ¶ 5 (last visited Nov. 25, 2009) 
(“[S]ome claim that the best way to protect the freedom of religion is to implement so-
called anti-defamation policies that would restrict freedom of expression and the 
freedom of religion. I strongly disagree.”); U.N. Rights Body Condemns “Defamation” of 
Religion, REUTERS, Mar. 30, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/ latestCrisis/idUSL 
30414112 (last visited Nov. 25, 2009) (pointing out the difference in position between 
Islam States and Western States); Marc D. Stern, Don’t Defend Religion By Silencing Free 
Speech, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 2, 2008, at 27 (calling for more 
governments to join the U.S. in paying attention to and debating the OIC proposals). 
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arguments against immigrants - that they are criminals, that their 
culture makes them a bad fit, that they take jobs from natives - are 
mutating into an anti-Islamic bias that is becoming institutionalized in 
the continent‖s otherwise ordinary politics”32.  
Such discriminatory biases is evident in the recent constitutional 
amendment passed by 57.5% of Swiss voters prohibiting the 
construction of new minarets33. A recent report from the OIC cites 
several such examples of discrimination. For example, a Dutch survey 
indicated a majority of the population in the Netherlands agreed that 
the country should stop allowing the construction of some mosques34. 
Additionally, a British study reporting that even dismissing the articles 
about the 9/11 attacks in the United States and the July 7, 2005 bombing 
in London, two thirds of newspaper articles about Muslims in England 
portrayed them as threatening and problematic35. In the United States, a 
Gallup poll found that thirty-nine percent of Americans have felt some 
prejudice towards Muslims36. The report also describes problems faced 
by Muslims in education (lack of curriculum about Islamic history and 
civilization), in government (lack of knowledge of the state language), 
and other generally discriminatory practices (lack of employment, 
headscarf bans, etc.) as problems faced by Muslims regularly37. It also 
lists a number of “Islamophobic” incidents, from incidents as relatively 
mild as op-eds against Islam to crimes as serious as personal physical 
attacks on Muslims and attacks on groups and property such as 
congregations and mosques38. 
Certainly much of this prejudicial behavior is real. Muslims 
should have a right to peacefully believe and practice the Islamic 
religion and there are, at times, behavior and comments that make it 
difficult to do so. Again, at least facially, the OIC is motivated to 
promulgate defamation of religions as a protection against such 
behavior. There are certainly issues of prejudice here that deserve 
sensitive treatment. Nonetheless, critics assert that the defamation of 
                                                          
32. Noah Feldman, The Way We Live Now: The New Pariahs?, N. Y. TIMES, Jun. 22, 
2008, at available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/22/magazine/22wwln-lede-
t.html?_r=1&ref=magazine&oref=slogin. 
33. See, e.g, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minaret_controversy_in_Switzerland. 
34. OIC, 2ND OIC OBSERVATORY REPORT ON ISLAMOPHOBIA: JUNE 2008 TO APRIL 
2009,at 9–10 (2009), OIC-CS-2d OBS-REP-FINAL-May 10, 2009, available at 
http://www.oic-un.org/document_report/Islamophobia_rep_May_23_25_2009.pdf. 
35. Id. at 10. 
36. Id.. 
37. Id. at 12. 
38. Id. at 13–14. 
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 9 
religions movement is more about granting OIC member-States even 
more power to oppress their citizenry and to assure the preeminence of 
Islam as a state religion. Through such a lens, the OIC‖s resolutions 
appear as a poorly masked method to infringe on individual rights of 
expression and religion in the name of protecting against defamation of 
religions39. 
 
 
3 - Defamation of Religions: A Permissible Restraint on Freedom of 
Speech and Expression?  
 
The theory of defamation of religions as set forth by the OIC takes a 
wide divergence from the traditional defamation doctrine. The essential 
question, considered in the framework established by foundational 
texts in international human rights law, is whether defamation can be 
narrowly applied to preserve civility and respect for adherents of 
minority religions while still allowing for freedom of speech and 
religious expression. Answering that question requires a knowledge 
and comparison of the doctrine of defamation in various legal 
traditions, an understanding of the human rights enumerated in 
international instruments, and an application of the defamation of 
religions theory to the enumerated rights. 
 
3.a - History, Basic Elements, and Contemporary Usage of Defamation 
 
In writing about the varied history of defamation, Prosser and Keeton 
stated “it must be confessed at the beginning that there is a great deal of 
the law of defamation which makes no sense. It contains anomalies and 
absurdities for which no legal writer ever has had a kind word”40. In the 
middle ages, reputation was defended vigorously and led to 
defamation becoming an actionable right providing for recovery in the 
late 1500s41. With the advent of the printing press and the attendant 
implications for an absolute monarchy, German and English law 
                                                          
39. See, e.g., Steven Groves, Why the U.S. Should Oppose “Defamation of Religions” 
Resolutions at the United Nations, BACKGROUNDER, (The Heritage Foundation), No. 
2206, Nov. 10, 2008, available at http://www.heritage.org/research/LegalIssues/up 
load/bg_2206.pdf; Christopher Hitchens, Don’t Say a Word, SLATE, Mar. 2, 2009, 
http://www. slate.com/id/2212662/. 
40. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, 771 
(5th ed. 1984). 
41. Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 Colum. L. 
Rev. 546, 546-47 (1903). 
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adopted Roman defamation laws directly42, thus laying the foundation 
for defamation jurisprudence in both the civil and the common law 
traditions. Early on, defamation laws were designed to protect 
individuals, and sometimes groups, from hateful, libelous, or 
slanderous comments43. However, there is no evidence that any law has 
ever protected an idea or a collection of ideas from what may be 
deemed defamatory comments.  
The concept of defamation wound its way through both English 
common law history and the civil law history of other States. In the 
United States it eventually became a tort, but in civil law traditions it 
generally emerged as a criminal statute44. However, several countries 
are in the process of decriminalizing defamation45, and between 2005 
and 2007, only a few countries punished five or more individuals for 
defamation by fine or imprisonment46. Thus, defamation generally does 
not rise to the import of a crime and retains only limited status as a tort 
for which some remedy may be sought. Even though defamation is, in 
                                                          
42. Id. at 547. 
43. Id. at 548–49. 
44. See, e.g., SERGE L. LEVITSKY, COPYRIGHT, DEFAMATION, AND PRIVACY IN SOVIET 
CIVIL LAW 114–51 (1979) (outlining the law of defamation in the Soviet Union); 
Alexander Bruns, Access to Media Sources in Defamation Litigation in the United States 
and Germany, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT‖L L. 283 (comparing actions and remedies for 
defamation in the United States with those under the German civil law). 
45. See, e.g., TOBY MENDEL, ASSESSMENT OF MEDIA DEVELOPMENT IN THE MALDIVES 5 
(2009) (explaining that defamation is a criminal offense in the Maldives but indicating 
that this is not the favorable treatment when compared with practices internationally). 
But see Article 19, Defamation Legislation Maps, http://www. 
article19.org/advocacy/defamationmap/map (last visited Nov. 25, 2009) (showing 
that, though a majority of countries have criminal defamation legislation in place, a 
number of those countries have already initiated decriminalization of defamation). 
46. Article 19, Maps: Punishment, http://www.article19.org/advocacy/defamatio 
nmap/map/?dataSet=imprisonment (last visited Nov. 25, 2009) (showing that China, 
the Philippines, Uzbekistan, Iran, Syrian Arab Republic, Egypt, Chad, and the Congo 
were the few countries punishing five or more individuals for defamation). 
Interestingly, three of those countries - China, Uzbekistan, and Iran - are on the U.S. 
Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) Countries of Particular 
Concern List, http://www.uscirf.gov/index.php?option=com_ content&task=view& 
id=1456&Itemid=59 (last visited Nov. 25, 2009), and one other – Egypt - is on the 
USCIRF Watch List, http://www.uscirf.gov/ index.php?option=com_content&task= 
view&id=1457&Itemid=60 (last visited Nov. 25, 2009), indicating a close correlation 
between countries that put more value on enforcing defamation statutes and 
enforcing defamatory language and those that have “ongoing, egregious violations of 
religion freedom,” or which “require close monitoring due to the nature and extent of 
violation of religious freedom engaged in or tolerated by the government”. 
Countries of Particular Concern List supra; USCIRF Watch List supra. 
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very few countries, still considered a serious enough infringement to 
warrant criminal penalties in some cases, it is important to understand 
that the basic elements of defamation apply to the rights of individuals 
to maintain their reputations. In rare instances where States punish 
defamation through criminal penalties, the government often uses the 
punishment neither to protect an individual‖s reputation nor to enforce 
a human right to dignity, but rather to maintain autocratic stability and 
absolute government control. 
The Constitution of the United States, along with First 
Amendment jurisprudence, provides strong protection for the freedom 
speech. Accordingly, defamation in the United States has withered into 
little more than a narrowly-defined tort providing limited injunctive 
and/or monetary remedies. Contemporarily, the basic rule for finding 
liability for defamation in the United States requires four elements: 
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an 
unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting to at least 
negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d) either actionability on 
the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special 
harm caused by the publication47.  
It is worth reiterating that the statement must be false, it must be 
about another individual, and it must be in a publication that is not 
privileged. Additionally, the plaintiff must show that the speaker or 
publisher of the statement acted negligently and that the publication or 
the statement resulted in harm to the plaintiff. Therefore, in the United 
States a true statement cannot be defamation, even if it is defamatory in 
nature48; neither can a defamatory comment about a belief or idea be 
defamation per se because it is not made about a person49. Once a 
person is held liable for defamation, U.S. Courts may award a plaintiff 
actual damages only50, meaning compensation for the harm the 
publication caused to the plaintiff‖s reputation51. There is neither any 
                                                          
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977). 
48. “A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of 
another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons 
from associating or dealing with him”. Id. § 559. 
49. Id. § 564 cmt. a (noting that “the recipient of the defamatory communication 
understand [that the communication] refer[s] to the plaintiff”). In this case the 
language and intent of the law clearly indicates that defamation is applicable to 
publications in which statements are made regarding individuals, not thoughts, 
beliefs, or ideals.  
50. Id. § 621. 
51. Id. at cmt. a. 
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criminal statute nor any criminal penalty for defamation in the United 
States. 
Defamation plays out differently in civil law countries. As 
mentioned above, most other countries in the world have criminal 
defamation statutes on the books, but few regularly enforce them. 
Germany has defended criminal defamation statutes, stating that they 
are needed to guarantee the right to dignity as stated in the German 
Constitution52. However, truth is generally not a complete defense 
under the Western European defamation criminal statutes as it is in U.S. 
civil provisions53. This indicates a stronger desire in Western Europe to 
protect an atmosphere of civility and respect and an increased 
willingness to infringe on an individual‖s rights of freedom of speech 
and expression. 
An even larger gap exists between defamation as defined in the 
United States and defamation as defined in Eastern European and 
Central Asian countries. Countries such as Belarus, Azerbaijan, 
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan  - all members of 
the OIC -  also retain criminal defamation statutes54. Additionally, some 
of these countries actively prosecute and convict journalists under 
defamation statutes, in an ostensible effort to encourage self-
censorship55. At best, criminal defamation statutes began as “a peaceful 
alternative to the duel and other violent forms of self help”56, but at 
worst, they are “rooted in authoritarianism and autocracy, in 
intolerance of dissent, and in distrust of public opinion. [They] keep[] 
the masses in their place and under control, by suppressing information 
about rulers that might incite unrest or rebellion”57.  
Note that criminal defamation statutes as used in the 
aforementioned OIC member-countries have amounted to little more 
                                                          
52. See Peter E. Quint, Free Speech and Private Law in German Constitutional Theory, 48 
MD. L. REV. 247, 295 (1989); GG, pt. I, art. 1., Protection of Human Dignity (1990).  
53. Jane E, Kirtley, Criminal Defamation: An “Instrument of Destruction,” in ENDING 
THE CHILLING EFFECT: WORKING TO REPEAL CRIMINAL LIBEL AND INSULT LAWS 89–101, 
94 (Ana Karlsreiter and Hanna Vuokko eds., 2004). 
54. See generally, Elena Yanchukova, Criminal Defamation and Insult Laws: An 
Infringement on the Freedom of Expression in European and Post-Communist Jurisdictions, 
41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‖L L. 861.  
55. Kirtley, supra note 53 at 97 (citing Elana Yanchukova, Criminal Defamation and 
Insult Laws: An Infringement on the Freedom of Expression in European and Post-
Communist Jurisdictions, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‖L L. 861 (2003)). 
56. MLRC Bulletin, Criminalizing Speech About Reputation: The Legacy of 
Criminal Libel in the U.S. After Sullivan and Garrison, at 1 (March 2003), quoted in 
Kirtley, supra note 53 at 98. 
57. Kirtley, supra note 53 at 98. 
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than a guise through which the state can justify intolerance and 
suppression of contrary ideas and information. It is easy to see how 
such countries  - where the sovereign is used to being able to prosecute 
and terminate anti-government speech, where there is a substantial 
percentage of the population who are active adherents to a particular 
religion, and where that religion is often an official state religion - 
would justify taking the short step towards protecting that official 
religion, and from there to protecting religion generally through an 
expansion of existing defamation theories bolstered by the human right 
of freedom of religion. At first glance, the potential costs to freedom of 
expression and freedom of religion are not obvious; thus, defamation of 
religions may appear as an acceptable vehicle for such countries to 
safeguard their ability to silence individuals or groups with viewpoints 
deemed detrimental to the religion and the state. However, relying on 
the human right of freedom of religion to justify censorship and 
oppression does not align with the meaning or purpose of the 
promulgation and enforcement of international human rights. No 
“State, group or person [has] any right to engage in any activity or 
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any [human right or 
fundamental freedom]”58.  
 
3.b - Interaction Between Defamation of Religions and the Basic 
Human Rights Enumerated in Major International Instruments 
 
Establishing a universal definition of human rights has proven 
challenging. In 1948, the General Assembly of the U.N. adopted the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”)59. This declaration 
recognizes that the “foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the 
world” are the “inherent dignities” and the “equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family”60. Though the UDHR 
implicitly asserts universality of the enumerated rights, some nations 
aver that this view reflects neither their traditional culture, nor their 
religious beliefs. The foundational principles of the UDHR varied 
enough from the foundational beliefs of Islamic States that the OIC 
                                                          
58. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as 
amended by Protocol No. 11, Sept. 2003. 
59. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). 
60. Id.  
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drafted and submitted the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam 
(the “Cairo Declaration”) in 199361. 
The Cairo Declaration asserts many rights similar to the UDHR62; 
however, the guiding principles are clearly limited to providing a 
“dignified life in accordance with the Islamic Shari‖ah” and the key 
rights enumerated in the Cairo Declaration are “subject to the Islamic 
Shari‖ah”63. Human rights in the Cairo Declaration are “an integral part 
of the Islamic religion” and are “binding divine commandments, ... 
contained in the Revealed Books of God and ... sent through the last of 
His Prophets ... thereby making their observance an act of worship and 
their neglect or violation an abominable sin, and accordingly every 
person is individually responsible ... for their safeguard”64.  
Realistically, it would be impossible for any international body to 
adopt such a declaration since, by favoring Islam, it would be 
disfavoring all the other religions in the world. Therefore, where the 
Cairo Declaration enjoyed only limited support  - generally from 
Islamic States - the UDHR maintained its status as the most widely 
supported declaration of human rights65. It provides guidelines for an 
evolving international human rights jurisprudence. Addressing the 
broad-ranging and often subtle difficulties regarding cultural relativism 
and state imperialism surrounding the human rights debate exceeds the 
scope of this Article; however, it is enough to recognize that there is no 
unanimous consensus regarding “universal human rights.” Since the 
UDHR has been adopted by a majority of U.N. nation States, it can be 
used as a starting point for developing a common ground. Through its 
quasi-universal lens, human rights are viewed as a most basic 
endowment of autonomy, common in one way or another to all 
                                                          
61. OIC, The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, Secretariat, Status of 
Preparation of Publications, Studies and Documents for the World Conference, 
delivered to the World Conference on Human Rights Preparatory Committee, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.18 (June 9, 1993). 
62. See, e.g., id. art. I(a) (“All human beings ... are equal in terms of basic human 
dignity ...”). 
63. Id. art. 24. 
64. Id. art. I(a) para. 5. 
65. The UDHR was adopted by the General Assembly on Dec. 10, 1948 after a vote 
resulting in 48 in favor, 0 against and 8 abstentions. See UDHR, supra note 56. In 
contrast, the Cairo Declaration was adopted by 45 ministers of the OIC, but has been 
generally rejected by the U.N. community. But see HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS: VOLUME II: REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS (1997) (including 
the Cairo Declaration as the final document in this collection compiled by The Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights). 
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humankind and deserving of the most stringent protection possible 
through legal instruments and government regulation. 
The UDHR declares that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion; ... and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion 
or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance”66, and that 
there is a “right to freedom of opinion and expression” including the 
right to “hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers”67. Undoubtedly, there are instances in which one individual‖s 
opinions might be contrary to another‖s religious belief, a tension 
foreshadowed in U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence. Thus, the clear 
difficulty in attempting to protect against defamation of religions comes 
in determining where to draw the line between protecting individual 
rights to believe and practice a religion and individual rights to hold 
and express opinions  - some of which may be offensive to certain sects.  
Additionally, Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights68 (“ICCPR”) creates a nuance in the already tense 
balance between freedom to believe and practice one‖s religion and 
freedom to hold and express one‖s opinion. “Everyone shall have the 
right to freedom of expression; ... [t]he exercise of [which] carries with it 
special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain 
restrictions ... [f]or respect of the rights or reputations of others ...”69. 
Article 19 thus specifically provides for a limitation on free expression 
and gives the OIC a foundation to claim that its resolutions combating 
defamation of religions are nothing more than an attempt to 
                                                          
66. UDHR, supra note 56 art. 18 
67. Id. art. 19. 
68. The ICCPR is a U.N. treaty designed as the legal documentation enforcing the 
UDHR and entered into force on March 23, 1976. See Audiovisual Library of 
International Law, http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/iccpr/iccpr.html (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2010). 
69. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 19(2)–(3)(a) (adopted 
16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR). 
Seventeen countries (including the United States) have entered declarations or 
reservations on all or part of ICCPR Article 20. See International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights Declarations and Reservations, http://treaties.un.org/doc/publi 
cation/mtdsg/volume%20i/chapter%20iv/iv-4.en.pdf (listing Australia, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the 
United States as making declarations or reservations as to article 20). 
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appropriately limit the right of expression70. The Special Rapporteur on 
the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression agrees that the ICCPR provides that there must be a limit on 
freedom of expression, but asserts that the limitations allowed by 
Article 19 “should be clearly and narrowly defined” so as to be the 
“least intrusive means” of limiting expression and should not be 
allowed to justify prior censorship on speech71.  
Another complication in this balancing act appears in Article 20 
of the ICCPR. “Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that 
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be 
prohibited by law”72. The OIC has conflated defamation of religions 
with “incitement to religious hatred” and thus has justified its advocacy 
of permissible limitations on the freedom of expression73. In the OIC‖s 
effort to secure its right to believe and worship without suffering 
offensive expressions from others, it presents the two doctrines of 
defamation of religions and incitement to violence as if they are the 
same. In fact, defamation of religions is a much broader category - one 
under which incitement may fall, but which still would allow for much 
broader regulation than incitement would alone. Incitement, unlike 
defamation of religions, is a specific existing legal doctrine with varied 
definitions depending on the country at issue.  
In the United States, incitement is a very narrowly enforced 
doctrine. It prohibits the government from regulating speech as 
incitement unless the speech was “directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action”74. The three requirements of the present-day test - intent, 
imminence, and likelihood -  make it a very narrow doctrine. However, 
before promulgating the contemporary, narrow rule, the Court was 
                                                          
70. OIC, 2ND OIC OBSERVATORY REPORT ON ISLAMOPHOBIA: JUNE 2008 TO APRIL 2009, 
5, 15, 44 (2009), OIC-CS-2d OBS-REP-FINAL-May 10, 2009, available at 
http://www.oic-oci.org/uploads/file/Islamophobia/Islamophobia_rep_May_23_25_ 
2009.pdf (emphasizing that the ICCPR Art. 19 provides for “certain restrictions” on 
the freedom of expression and reiterating that the U.N. General Assembly approves of 
limiting expression to protect against defamation of religions as manifest by the 
passing of defamation of religions resolutions since 1999).  
71. Special Rapporteur, Report on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶65, delivered to the Human Rights Council, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/14 (2008). 
72. ICCPR, supra note 66 Art. 20. 
73. OIC, supra note 62 at 14. 
74. Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
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much more lenient as to what constituted incitement75. This seemed 
particularly so in times of national stress or danger76.  
Internationally, incitement can be a much more serious offense 
and is often criminalized77. Each country has various definitions of 
incitement  - an exploration of which go beyond the scope of this paper 
- but in general much of the consequential international law of 
incitement has been motivated by the desire to prevent massacres such 
as the Holocaust of World War II, the “cleansing” of Muslim 
inhabitants in Bosnia in the early 1990s, or the Rwandan genocide of 
199478. This has led to broader definitions of incitement that allow for 
more regulation of expression than would be permissible in the United 
States. Generally, direct, public incitement is viewed more seriously 
than private incitement79 and, there is often some requirement that the 
“incitee” have at least some intent to act - though the action itself does 
not necessarily have to be accomplished80.  
In this case, though, the expressions that the OIC desires to limit 
do not always rise to the level of even the broader non-U.S. definitions 
of incitement. The Danish cartoons as well as other expressions81 
condemned by the OIC are expressions covered under Article 19 of the 
UDHR and Article 19 of the ICCPR, and therefore should be limited 
only if they are shown to be “advocacy of national, racial or religious 
                                                          
75. See, e.g., Schenk v. U.S. 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. U.S., 249 U.S. 211 (1919); 
Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 246 F.24 (S.D.N.Y. 1917). 
76. See, e.g., Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 
(1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
77. See Wibke Kristin Timmermann, Incitement In International Criminal Law, 88 
INT‖L REV. RED CROSS 823 (2006), available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0. 
nsf/htmlall/review-864-p823/$File/irrc_864_Timmermann.pdf (including an 
excellent discussion of the history and evolution of incitement in international law).  
78. Timmerman, supra note 74, at 823-824. 
79. Id. at 838–839. One example of a fairly stringent incitement law comes from the 
German Penal Code, providing that “instigators” are punishable for influencing the 
will of another to commit a criminal act - even if that person‖s effort to commit the act 
fails. Id. at 848. The U.N.‖s Convention on Genocide prohibits “[d]irect and public 
incitement to commit genocide”, United Nations Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art. 3(c). 
80. Timmerman, supra note 75, at 839 (“[T]he instigation must be causally 
connected to the substantive crime in that it must have contributed significantly to the 
commission of the latter, the instigator must act intentionally or be aware of the 
substantial likelihood that the substantive crime will be committed, and he must 
intend to bring about the crime instigated”). 
81. See, e.g., Life of Slain Dutch Film-Maker, BBC NEWS, Nov. 2, 2004, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/3975211.stm. 
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hatred [constituting] incitement to ... violence”82. Though the 
publication of the Danish cartoons and other expressions labeled as 
defamatory by the Muslim community have been followed by violence, 
as noted above, the violence in this case was more akin to violence that 
would lead to a heckler‖s veto83 than violence springing as result of 
incitement.  
Generally, for a statement or publication to be incitement, the 
speaker speaks to a group who then, incited by the speaker‖s words, 
goes forward with the intent to commit an illegal act. In this case, the 
resultant violence was not “incitees” acting out violence against 
Muslims, rather, Muslim extremists were reacting to the offensive 
cartoons, films, or statements and attempting to silence those who had 
published and provided access to the ideas expressed. Not surprisingly, 
this campaign of violence was effective and publishers have shied away 
from printing materials that may result in a violent reaction from 
Islamic extremists84, including a refusal to print a novel about one of 
Mohammed‖s wives because of the fear of ensuing violence85. In India, 
a newspaper editor was arrested for publishing material criticizing 
Islam (as well as Christianity and Judaism) after Muslims protested the 
paper86. Thus, the violent actions of the offended extremists have been 
                                                          
82. ICCPR, supra note 67, at art. 20. 
83. “[A] ―heckler‖s veto‖ is an impermissible content-based restriction on speech 
where the speech is prohibited due to an anticipated disorderly or violent reaction of 
the audience”. 16A Am. Jur. 2D Constitutional Law § 477 (2010); see, e.g., Pleasant 
Grove City v. Summum, 129 S.Ct. 1125 (2009); Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 
F.3d 183 (3d Cir. 2008); Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2008); Center for Bio-
Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Las Angeles County Sherriff Dep‖t, 533 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2008). 
84. See, e.g., Publisher’s Statement, Author’s Statement in JYTTE KLAUSEN, THE 
CARTOONS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD, vi (2009). 
85. See Asra Q. Nomani, You Still Can’t Write About Muhammad, THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL ONLINE (Aug. 6, 2008) available at http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print 
/SB121797979078815073.html. Later, the same novel was contracted to be published in 
the United Kingdom, but was dropped again after the publisher‖s home was 
firebombed. See Jamin Doward and Mark Townsend, Firebomb Attack on Book Publisher, 
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 28, 2008) available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/sep 
/sep/28/muhammad.book.attack; Sarah Lyall, Attack May Be Tied to Book About 
Muhammad, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2008) available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09 
/29/world/europe/29jewel.htm?_r=2&oref=slogin. Ultimately, the book was 
published and distributed by a U.S. publisher - not without controversy. See Laurel 
Maury, ‘Jewel’ is Finally Here; Was it Worth the Wait? L.A. TIMES (OCT. 6, 2008) available 
at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/oct/06/ entertainment/ et-book6. 
86. Jerome Taylor, Editor Arrested for ‘Outraging Muslims,’ Independent (Feb. 12, 
2009) available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/editor-arrested-
for-outraging-muslims-1607256.html. 
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validated and have had a documented “chilling effect” on the category 
of expressions at issue. 
In addition to successfully chilling expression through actions 
akin to a heckler‖s veto, the OIC states have successfully played 
defamation from two sides. On one side, they allow Islamic extremists 
to create an atmosphere of fear through violent reactions to actions 
deemed defamatory to Islam in non-member states without loudly 
decrying that behavior87, thus encouraging a disposition of absolute 
protection for Islam. On the other side, OIC states have used the 
defamation of religions theory to persecute individuals and groups 
within their own borders for blasphemy, defamation, or slander of 
Islam  - thus squelching any dissenting or critical discourse88. This self-
preservation approach is clearly manifest in the evolution of the 
defamation of religions resolutions from the U.N. 
 
 
4 - The Evolution of a Resolution 
 
The defamation of religions resolutions have slowly changed since they 
were first introduced in 1999. Originally, they were passed through the 
U.N. commission without so much of a vote, but have since been voted 
on numerous times and now appear to be losing support in the General 
Assembly. In some cases, the changes in the text demonstrate an 
increased effort for the OIC to promote protection of Islam over all 
other religions and an effort to present defamation of religions as a 
permissible limitation of freedom of speech and religious expression. 
 
4.a - 1999-2000: Beginnings 
 
As mentioned above, the defamation of religions statute was passed 
without a vote from 1999-2001, and when the Commission first put it to 
a vote, it passed easily89. The resolutions have continued to pass when 
voted on by the General Assembly in 2005 and every year since then90. 
Though the 1999 resolution specifically mentions “Islam” twice, it also 
                                                          
87. See sources cited supra note 83. 
88. See infra Parts V.C.1-2. 
89. See supra Part I.A. 
90. Supra note 25; Infra notes 97, 110, 118, 124, 125, 127, 134. 
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uses the more general term “religion” several times91 indicating that 
though the resolution was sponsored by the OIC, there was certainly 
room for protection against defamation of any religion. This first 
resolution had just three recommended actions. First, it urged States to 
“take all necessary measures to combat hatred, discrimination, 
intolerance and acts of violence, intimidation and coercion motivated 
by religious intolerance”92. Second, it “[i]nvite[d] the High 
Commissioner ... to formalize the holding of seminars to promote a 
dialogue among cultures” in order to add to the dialogue on universal 
human rights93. Finally, it asked that the Special Rapporteurs on 
religious intolerance and on racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia 
and related intolerance ... take into account the provisions of the present 
resolution when reporting to the Commission on Human Rights at 
subsequent sessions94. The most problematic of these is the 
encouragement of state action to “take all necessary measures” to 
combat the offensive behavior constituting defamation of religions. This 
broad directive encouraged States to act appropriately “within their 
national legal framework [and] in conformity with international human 
rights instruments”95. There was neither a specific mention of how 
those actions may engage other rights, nor was there a suggested 
boundary on the limitations that may be justified as appropriate to 
combat the offensive behavior. This set the stage for a very broad 
application of government limitations on otherwise protected 
expressions because they defame a religion. 
The 2000 resolution asserted that “discrimination based on 
religion or belief constitutes an offence to human dignity and a violation of 
human rights”96. This was a much stronger assertion than anything in 
the earlier resolution and signaled a move towards even broader 
protections threatening more limitations on rights of expression. The 
new resolution still advocated the same three actions as the earlier 
version with no other major changes. 
                                                          
91. ESCOR, Comm‖n on Human Rights, Pakistan, Draft Res. Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and all Forms of Discrimination, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1999/L.40 (Apr. 20, 1999). 
92. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
93. Id. at 3. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. CHR Res. 2000/84, at 336, U.N. ESCOR, 56th Sess. Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2000/167 (Apr. 26, 2000) (emphasis added). 
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4.b - 2001: A Pre-9/11 World 
 
The 2001 resolution was passed by a vote of twenty-eight to fifteen with 
nine abstentions in April, before the September 11 attacks in the United 
States97. This resolution specifically used “Islam” only once  - perhaps 
in an attempt to broaden the protections for all religions -  but, for the 
first time used “defamation of religions” in the actual text of the 
Resolution. First, it “not[ed] with concern that defamation of religions is 
among the causes of social disharmony and leads to violation of the 
human rights of their adherents”98. Second, it asked States “to provide 
adequate protection against all human rights violations resulting from 
defamation of religions”99. The use of the “defamation of religions” 
language is interesting because there had never been a concise 
definition for “defamation of religions.” Thus far, all the resolutions 
had provided is a sort of amorphous list of words with very little 
decisive meaning  - intolerance, discrimination, violence, intimidation, 
coercion. From this language it was difficult to know whether 
defamation of religions was an act against a religion or some type of 
inchoate offense. If it was inchoate, there were no guidelines to 
determine what would fit the category. This vagueness created the 
opportunity for States to draft enormously broad statutes that could be 
deemed permissible limitations on expression and the exercise of 
religion based on the resolution.  
Additionally, this resolution was also the first in which the OIC 
encouraged States, within their own law and value systems, to “provide 
adequate protections against all human rights violation resulting from 
defamation of religions”100. This goes a step further than the “necessary 
measures to combat” language in the original resolution suggesting that 
the OIC favored stronger protection against defamation of religions 
than may have been indicated earlier. 
Furthermore, the indication that preventing defamation of 
religions will protect human rights is clearly articulated for the first 
time in this resolution with the assumption that the right to be 
protected has to do with the right to hold and practice religious beliefs. 
Interestingly, there is still no mention of the potential conflict between 
                                                          
97. CHR Res. 2001/4, at 47, U.N. ESCOR, 58th Sess., Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2001/167 (Apr. 18, 2001). 
98. Id. at 48. 
99. Id.  
100. Id. 
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creating and enforcing defamation of religions statutes and the right to 
expression.  
This version also emphasized a need for “respect for religious 
diversity”101 and added to the list of actions requested as a response to 
the resolution. Specifically, it called for joint conferences between the 
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights and other organizations to 
inform the conversation surrounding the universality of human rights 
and requested a report from the High Commissioner to the Commission 
at a subsequent session102. 
 
4.c - 2002: Reactions to the Violent Backlash Against Muslims 
 
The 2002 resolution passed after the September 11 attacks and used the 
strongest language yet in favor of defining defamation of religions as an 
“affront to human dignity and a disavowal of the principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations”103. Additionally, it contained noticeably 
more references to “Islam” and “Muslim” than any of the earlier 
resolutions. Islam is mentioned three times and Muslim is used 
seven104. What is most surprising about much of the language in this 
version is that it still emphasized prejudicial behavior towards Muslims 
only. For example: “Alarmed at the impact of the events of 11 
September 2001 on Muslim minorities and communities in some non-
Muslim countries and the negative projection of Islam, Muslim values 
and traditions by the media as well as the introduction and enforcement 
of laws that specifically discriminate against and target Muslims”105. 
Clearly, the backlash against Muslims resulting from the attacks was 
real and, in many cases, prejudicial and discriminatory. However, the 
resolution made no mention of the prejudice and discrimination that 
motivated the attacks nor does it include language indicating that those 
injured in the attacks were also deserving of protection.  
This resolution provided another justification for the defamation 
of religions theory by calling for increased respect of all cultures in 
hopes of creating a “globalized world” and recognized that allowing 
the continuing defamation of religions was incompatible with that 
                                                          
101. Id. 
102. Id at 2. 
103. CHR Res. 2002/9, at 56, U.N. ESCOR, 58th Sess., Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2002/200 (Apr. 15, 2002). 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 57. 
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goal106. Essentially, through the resolution, the OIC suggested that 
unless action was taken to provide for protection against defamation of 
religions, globalization was an impossible goal. This version also noted 
“the intensification of the campaign of defamation of religions,” 
particularly as applied to profiling of Muslims107 and “express[ed] deep 
concern at programmes and agendas pursued by extremist 
organizations and groups aimed at defamation of religions”108. 
Finally, this resolution called for more action than previous 
versions. It asked the “international community” to begin a dialogue 
forwarding tolerance and respect for individuals and for “religious 
diversity”; and most specifically asked the “Special Rapporteur on 
contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and 
related intolerance to examine the situation of Muslim and Arab 
peoples”109. The marked increased of specific references to “Muslim” 
and “Islam” indicated an increased willingness of the OIC to assert the 
right to protection of Islam above the right of such protection for other 
beliefs and expressions of such beliefs. The 2002 resolution enjoyed 
slightly increased support over the previous resolution and passed by a 
vote of thirty to fifteen with eight abstentions110. 
 
4.d - 2003-2004: Fluctuations in Support 
 
The 2003 resolution specifically mentioned Islam three times and used 
“Muslim” five times continuing the strong preferential treatment for 
Islam and its adherents that had been strongly asserted the previous 
year111. The resolution reasserted the theses that “defamation of 
religions is among the causes of social disharmony and leads to 
violations of human rights of their adherents”112, and that “defamation 
of religions and cultures [is incompatible] with the objectives of a truly 
globalized world and the promotion and maintenance of international 
peace and security”113. It articulated “deep concern [about] the 
intensification of the campaign of defamation of religions, and the 
                                                          
106. Id.  
107. Id. at 58. 
108. Id.  
109. Id. at 59. 
110. Id. at 61. 
111. CHR Res. 2003/4, at 34-37, U.N. ESCOR, 59th Sess., Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2003/135 (Apr. 14, 2003). 
112. Id. at 35. 
113. Id. 
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ethnic and religious profiling of Muslim minorities, in the aftermath of 
the tragic events of 11 September 2001”114, but still failed to recognize 
the profiling and other persecutions that other world religions had 
suffered in the same period.  
For the first time, this resolution “expresse[d] deep concern” 
regarding motivations and actions of “extremist organizations,” 
particularly those aided by governments, whose aim is to defame 
religions115. This version encouraged governments to “ensure that all 
public officials ... in the course of their official duties respect different 
religions and beliefs and do not discriminate on the grounds of religion 
or belief”116 and again requested that the Special Rapporteur on 
contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and 
related intolerance examine and report on physical assaults, and attacks 
on places of worship, businesses and properties of Muslim and Arab 
people specifically117. Thus, this resolution reiterated the preferential 
treatment for Islamic concerns and underscored the general acceptance 
of the defamation of religions resolutions by requesting particularized 
action by governments and officials to limit “defamation” specifically as 
directed towards Muslims. Again, this resolution had increased support 
and was adopted by a vote of thirty-two to fourteen with only seven 
abstentions118. 
The 2004 resolution recognized the report submitted by the 
Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, presumably 
submitted in response to the request in the 2003 resolution119. The 
recommendations to prevent defamation of religions in this version 
combined the “provide adequate protection” language of the 2001 and 
subsequent resolutions with the “take all appropriate measures” 
language of earlier versions120, perhaps indicating a disagreement as to 
the most appropriate language. Notably, this resolution marked the 
first decrease in support as it passed with three fewer votes than the 
previous year - twenty-nine in favor, sixteen opposed, and seven 
                                                          
114. Id. at 36. 
115. Id. 
116. Id.  
117. Id. at 37.  
118. Id. 
119. CHR Res. 2004/6, at 28, U.N. ESCOR, 60th Sess., Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2004/127 (Apr. 13, 2004). 
120. Id. at 30. 
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abstentions. The reasons for this temporary decrease are unclear and 
support for the resolution increased the following year. 
 
4.e - 2005: Intensification of a Campaign 
 
The 2005 resolution was noticeably longer than previous versions and 
included several additions. This version again demonstrated an 
increase of specific references to the Islamic religions using “Islam” six 
times and “Muslim” seven times121. This indicated at least a continuing 
effort to make the defamation of religions theory particularly applicable 
to Islam. Additionally, the resolution noted “the intensification of the 
campaign of defamation of religions” since September 11, 2001122. It 
asserted that “in the context of the fight against terrorism and the 
reaction to counter-terrorism measures, defamation of religions 
becomes an aggravating factor that contributes to the denial of 
fundamental rights and freedoms to target groups, as well as their 
economic and social exclusion” and emphasized “the need to effectively 
combat defamation of all religions, Islam and Muslims in particular, 
especially in human rights forums”123. This was a clear assertion that 
the defamation resolutions had not been as effective as the OIC had 
hoped and served as a call for increased limitation on expressions that 
could be deemed defamation of religions. This version of the resolution 
serves as a clear indication that the OIC believed Islam deserves 
particularized protection from offense compared to other religions. The 
Commission adopted this version on a vote of thirty-one to sixteen with 
five abstentions, indicating strong endorsement of these assertions that 
had such broad implications for human rights generally. 
 
4.f - 2006-2007: The Move to the General Assembly 
 
The 2006 resolution was the first to be adopted by the General 
Assembly, did not vary substantially from the 2005 resolution adopted 
by the Commission, and still made frequent, obvious, particularized 
reference to Islam and Muslims as a specific religion and group of 
adherents principally deserving of protection124. This resolution is 
important because it is the first adopted by majority vote by the main 
                                                          
121. CHR Res. 2005/3, U.N. ESCOR, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/L.12 
(April 12, 2005). 
122. Id. (emphasis added). 
123. Id. 
124. G.A. Res. 60/150, 60th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/60/150 (Jan. 20, 2006). 
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organ of the U.N. This brought heightened attention to the defamation 
of religions debate and encouraged participation by a wider swath of 
States regarding the issue. 
The 2007 resolution still made frequent reference to Islam and to 
Muslims, indicating that “defamatory” treatment of the religion and its 
adherents warranted special recognition and urging regulatory 
measures of such treatment. This resolution was the first to recognize 
the conflict between the defamation of religions theory and the right to 
freedom of expression. However, the resolution stated specifically that 
freedom of expression, “should be exercised with responsibility and 
may therefore be subject to limitation as provided by law and necessary 
for respect of the rights or reputations of others, protection of national 
security or of public order, public health or morals and respect for 
religions and beliefs”125. Furthermore, the resolution “[u]rge[d] States to 
take resolute action to prohibit” defamation of religions126. The first 
statement recognized the conflict and promptly asserted that protection 
against defamation of religions is a valid justification to limit the right 
of expression. The second took the “provide adequate protection” and 
“all appropriate measures” language of earlier versions to a new level -
requiring that States take “resolute action.” As this resolution also 
passed by a majority vote, it appeared that the main body of the U.N. 
accepted this assertion and that defamation of religions was gaining 
recognition and strength. 
 
4.g - 2008: Decreasing Margins of Support 
 
The 2008 resolution was substantively similar to the 2007 version. 
However, the newer version asked “the Secretary-General to submit a 
report on the implementation of the present resolution, including on the 
possible correlation between defamation of religions and the upsurge in 
incitement”127. Motivation for the inclusion of this request is unclear 
given that former resolutions and the resolution at issue already make 
the correlation between defamation of religions and 
incitement/intolerance. Perhaps the OIC was attempting to strengthen 
the link between the relatively new theory of defamation of religions 
and the already established laws regarding incitement. In linking the 
two theories, the OIC may have been attempting to lend credibility to 
                                                          
125. G.A. Res. 61/164, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/164 (Feb. 21, 2006) 
(emphasis added). 
126. Id. 
127. G.A. Res. 62/154, 62d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/62/154 (Mar. 6, 2008). 
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the defamation ideas thereby facilitating increased acceptance of the 
theory internationally. Notably, this version was not adopted by a 
majority, but by a plurality vote - twenty-one in favor, ten opposed, and 
fourteen abstentions - indicating a slight but noteworthy decrease of 
support that may have led to changes in subsequent resolutions. 
 
4.h - 2009: Current Resolution and Recommendations for Application 
 
The 2009 resolution had noticeably fewer references to Islam128. It was 
considerably longer than previous versions - seven pages rather than 
two, three, or four - and for the first time made repeated references to 
“incitement to religious hatred”129. It mentioned an “overall campaign 
of defamation of religions, and incitement to religious hatred in 
general” before specifically mentioning the “ethnic and religious 
profiling of Muslim minorities”130. The resolution “deplore[d] all acts of 
psychological and physical violence and assaults, and incitement 
thereto, against persons on the basis of their religion or belief”131. This 
broader language concerning the religions and beliefs implicated 
indicated a willingness to afford protection to more than just Islamic 
beliefs. This is important because the question of defamation may arise 
between opposing religions and the broader language removes the 
weight favoring protection specifically for Islam132. It also added the 
language “enact the necessary legislation” to the stated obligation for 
state action indicating strong encouragement to pass statutes regulating 
behavior that may be deemed defamation of religions133. 
Late in 2009, Belarus, the Syrian Arab Republic and Venezuela 
submitted a draft resolution that was subsequently approved by the 
General Assembly, the official version of which is not yet available134. 
This most recent draft specifically mentions “Islam” or “Muslim” only 
                                                          
128. G.A. Res. 63/171, 63d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/63/171 (Mar. 24, 2009). 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. For example, a Muslim may claim that the witness of a Christian is offensive 
because it asserts that Muhammad was not a prophet, that Christ is the Messiah, and 
that an individual can only be “saved” through faith in Christ. In this case, the 
Christian‖s exercise of a basic right of freedom of belief and practice runs in direct 
opposition to the core beliefs of the Muslim. Earlier resolutions emphasizing 
protection for Islam over other religions may provide support for countries embracing 
Islam as a state religion to prohibit any such actions deemed offensive to Islam. 
133. G.A. Res. 63/171, supra note 123. 
134. G.A. Res., 64/PV.65, 64th Sess., U.N. Doc A/Res/64/156 (Dec. 18, 2009). 
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three times and adds recognition of “the valuable contributions of all 
religions and beliefs to modern civilization and the contribution that 
dialogue among civilizations can make to an improved awareness and 
understanding of common values”135. This language is encouraging as 
it recognizes some value to all religious beliefs and encourages 
improved awareness and understanding among varied beliefs.  
This resolution also adds an assertion that defamation of 
religions “give[s] rise to polarization and disturb[s] social cohesion” 
and introduces a recognition of “the importance of the interface 
between religion and race, and that instances of multiple or aggravated 
forms of discrimination can arise on the basis of religion and other 
grounds such as race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin”136. 
This assertion may inspire stronger support for the prevention of 
defamation of religions as it perhaps appropriately conflates 
defamation ideals with those of racial or ethnic discrimination. 
Certainly, the right to believe and practice a religion is deserving of 
strict protections, similar to the strict restrictions on racial or ethnic 
discrimination. But discrimination is a different animal than defamation 
in that discrimination usually requires a showing of some sort of 
treatment or exclusion based primarily on the stated classification. On 
the other hand, defamation can be much more broadly interpreted such 
that another person‖s ideas or mere expression that may be offensive to 
adherents of a particular religion can be limited. This does not require a 
showing of unfair treatment or exclusion, merely an assertion that the 
expression offended and thus should be prohibited. This broad theory 
applied with the same force as protections designed to prevent racial or 
ethnic discrimination would most certainly impinge on individual 
rights of expression. 
This most recent General Assembly Resolution passed with 
eighty votes in favor, sixty-one votes opposed, and forty-two 
abstentions, indicating that support for the resolution continues to 
wane137. This version advocates for protection against defamation of 
religions generally, but still makes special mention only of Islam, 
stating that it is a religion that “is frequently and wrongly associated 
                                                          
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. G.A./10905, 64th Sess., General Assembly Adopts 56 Resulutions, 9 Decisions 
Recommended by Third Committee, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/ 
docs/2009/ga10905.doc.htm. 
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with human rights violations and terrorism”138. It also condemns 
“racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and all other forms of 
related intolerance”139; and it again urges member States to enact 
legislation to “provide ... adequate protection against acts of hatred, 
discrimination, intimidation and coercion resulting from the 
defamation of religions, and incitement to religious hatred in 
general”140. 
There continues to be debate about what this actually means and 
how States can enforce laws meant to prevent giving offense to what 
amounts to a collection of ideas and beliefs141. The most recent report 
and recommendations of the Special Rapporteur to the U.N. Human 
Rights Council (the “Council”) discuss this conceptual difficulty and 
advise that the Council move away from the “sociological notion of the 
defamation of religions” and instead embrace the “human rights 
concept of incitement to racial and religious hatred”142. The Special 
Rapporteur also notes this approach would lead towards the necessary 
balance between freedom of expression and the need to eliminate hate 
speech143.  
Interestingly, this approach shifts the focus from a general 
protection against defamation of religions towards an individualized 
protection against discrimination, incitement, and hate speech. It leans 
towards curbing undesirable words and actions against another person 
rather than against beliefs and provides slightly more preferential 
                                                          
138. G.A. 64th Sess., 3d Comm., Belarus, Syrian Arab Republic, and Venezuela: 
Draft Resolution: Combating Defamation of Religions, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/64/L.27 (Oct. 
29, 2009) at ¶ 7. 
139. Id. ¶ 12. 
140. Id. ¶ 15. 
141  See, e.g., John Cerone, Inappropriate Renderings: The Danger of Reductionist 
Resolutions, 33 BROOK. J. INT‖L L. 357 (2008) (illustrating the two extreme positions and 
asserting that the corpus of international law provides a sufficient framework to 
understand and find a balance between the interests); Joshua Foster, Prophets, 
Cartoons, and Legal Norms: Rethinking the United Nations Defamation of Religion 
Provisions, 48 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 19 (2009) (contending that the U.N.‖s approach is 
overly paternalistic and infringes on free speech principles); L. Bennett Graham, 
Defamation of Religions: The End of Pluralism?, 23 EMORY INT‖L L. REV. 69 (2009) 
(asserting that the defamation of religions solution is problematic because it inhibits 
the protection of other fundamental freedoms). 
142. Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, 
xenophobia and related intolerance, Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and 
Related Forms of Intolerance: Follow-up to and Implementation of the Durban Declaration and 
Programme of Action, ¶ 5, delivered to the Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/12/38 (Jul. 1, 2009) [hereinafter S.R. Report 2009]. 
143. Id. ¶ 19. 
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treatment for the right to hold and express autonomous opinions than 
would be provided by a strong anti-defamation approach.  
Over time, the Resolutions on the Defamation of religions have 
broadened to include all religions within their circle of proposed 
protection, but continue to specifically mention only Islam - setting it 
up as the one set of beliefs that is in particular need of such protections. 
The resolutions have asked state governments and international bodies 
to provide protection against defamation of religions in increasingly 
robust terms. Finally, they have made increasingly vigorous 
connections between defamation of religions and other more strictly 
prohibited expressions that are generally more narrowly defined such 
as incitement and racial discrimination. Though some changes are 
encouraging  - e.g. the inclusion of all religions as worthy of protection - 
others present concern about the enactment and enforcement of statutes 
designed to follow the defamation of religions principles and 
recommendations. An examination of such statutes and their 
enforcement in OIC member and non-member states exemplifies such 
concerns. 
 
 
5 - Consequences of Accepting the Resolutions and Subsequent 
Enactment of Statutes Designed to Prevent Defamation of Religions 
 
Broad acceptance of the Defamation of Religions Resolutions will 
contribute to the enactment and enforcement of overbroad, vague laws 
that may appear to protect religious interests, but actually impinge 
impermissibly on individual rights of freedom of expression and 
freedom of religion. Below are examples of laws and rulings in State 
courts that follow the doctrinal basis of the defamation of religions 
resolutions. The degree to which such a theory can infringe on the basic 
human rights of freedom of speech and expression are clearly 
illustrated in the following examples, including international 
adjudications as well as statutes and adjudications in OIC member and 
non-member states.  
 
5.a - Human Rights Committee 
 
The Human Rights Committee (the “Committee”) is a body of experts 
charged with monitoring the implementation of the ICCPR by State 
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parties144. The Committee is also the successor to the body that initially 
approved the defamation of religions resolutions and it tends to fall on 
the side of stricter protection against defamation. It has the authority to 
clarify articles of the ICCPR by issuing general comments and by 
hearing and deciding cases brought under the articles of the ICCPR. 
The cases brought pursuant to Article 20 reinforce the idea that the 
ICCPR provides broad discretion to limit an individual‖s freedom of 
expression because of the possibility of offending another‖s religious 
beliefs.  
1. J.R.T. & the W.G. Party v. Canada 
In this case, the Committee held that anti-Semitic views were 
expressions subject to limitation under Article 20 when the leader of an 
unincorporated political party created messages designed to «warn ... 
“of the dangers of international finance and international Jewry leading 
the world into wars, unemployment and inflation and the collapse of 
world values and principles”» that were accessible by telephone to 
persons who dialed a specific number145. The court‖s reasoning was 
limited and provided almost no instruction on how to determine where 
to draw the line between freedom of expression and the responsibility 
not to discriminate. 
2. Faurisson v. France 
Nearly ten years after J.R.T., the Committee upheld a conviction 
under French law for contesting the history of the Holocaust and held 
the conviction was not a violation of the ICCPR where a university 
professor questioned the existence of extermination gas chambers in 
Nazi concentration camps146 even though the professor claimed he had 
suffered ridicule, death threats and personal attacks, and asserted that 
the act under which he was prosecuted and convicted147 posed “a threat 
to freedom of research and freedom of expression”148. In this case, the 
                                                          
144. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human 
Rights Committee Website, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/ (last 
visited Mar. 4, 2009). 
145. J.R.T. and the W.G. Party v. Canada, CCPR/C/18/D/104/1981, Human 
Rights Committee (1981) available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html 
/104-1981.htm. 
146. Faurisson v. France, Communication No. 550/1993, U.N.Doc. 
CCPR/C/58/D/ 550/1993 (1996).  
147. The Act is questions was titled the “Gayssot Act” and “makes it an offence to 
contest the existence of the category of crimes against humanity . . . on the basis of 
which Nazi leaders were tried and convicted by the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg in 1945-1946.” Id. at ¶ 2.4. 
148. Id. at ¶ 2.5. 
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Committee considered several factors. First, it considered the issue 
through a broad social context, giving deference to the French 
government‖s assertion that challenging the truth of the Holocaust was 
a “principal vehicle for anti-semitism”149. Thus, the court found the 
limitation necessary under Article 19 because the government acted to 
prevent what it had determined constituted discrimination towards a 
particular group. 
 
5.b - The European Court of Human Rights 
 
Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (the “Court”) are not 
binding internationally beyond the forty-seven member States that have 
ratified the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
(“ECHR”). However, it is a court with international influence and its 
decisions provide some of the most persuasive authority available in 
analyzing the implications of parallel international instruments such as 
the ICCPR. John Cerone asserts that jurisprudence arising under Article 
10 of ECHR has provided “the most extensive freedom of expression 
jurisprudence”150. The Court is charged with interpretation of the 
ECHR and Cerone has identified two separate analyses with which the 
court has examined limitations on expression. The first relies on Article 
17 of the ECHR and applies to a narrow factual application. The second 
relies on the limitations clause of Article 10 and is applied more 
broadly. 
 
1. Limitations of expressions under Article 17 
 
Article 17 is an abuse of rights provision of the ECHR and states: 
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for 
any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or 
perform any act aimed at the destruction on any of the rights and 
freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is 
provided for in the Convention151. 
Though it is difficult to get facts to fit in this vague language, 
Cerone identified three factors the Court has considered when 
examining limitations on expressions specifically involving challenges 
to the validity of the Holocaust. Though these factors are likely fact-
                                                          
149. Id. at ¶ 9.7. 
150. Cerone, supra note 136, at 363 (analyzing in detail the cases and trends towards 
increasing limitations on expression as justified by defamation of religions principles). 
151. European Convention on Human Rights art. 17, Nov. 4, 1950, 2 B.D.I.E.L. 165. 
 Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it) 
aprile 2011                                                                                                              ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
 
 33 
specific, they give some insight into the Court‖s treatment of 
defamation issues. 
First, the expression being limited must be “one of the most 
serious forms of incitement to hatred of Jewish people”152. Second, the 
expression must infringe on the rights of others153. Finally, the 
expression must be a “serious threat to public order”154. Cerone notes 
that these factors have been strictly limited to cases involving a denial 
of the Holocaust because of the “significance of the Holocaust in 
European history”155. He further notes that the Court otherwise accords 
a lofty status to Article 10, holding that “freedom of expression ... 
constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and 
one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual‖s 
self-fulfillment”156. 
 
2. Limitations of expression under Article 10 
 
When examining limitations on expression that are not denials of the 
Holocaust, the Court‖s analysis stays more closely aligned with the 
limitations clause of Article 10157 which states: 
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions, or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or 
rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary158. 
                                                          
152. Cerone, supra note 136, at 364. 
153. Id. 
154. Id.  
Denying crimes against humanity is therefore one of the most serious forms of 
racial defamation of Jews and of incitement to hatred of them. The denial or rewriting 
of this type of historical fact undermines the values on which the fight against racism 
and anti-Semitism are based and constitutes a serious threat to public order. Such acts 
are incompatible with democracy and human rights because they infringe the right of 
others. Their proponents indisputably have designs that fall into the category of aims 
prohibited by Article 17 of the Convention. 
Id. at 364–65 n.47 (citing Garaudy v. France, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 369, 397). 
155. Id. at 365. 
156. Id. (quoting Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (1986)). 
157. Id.  
158. ECHR, supra note 152 at art. 10(2). 
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The standard analysis the Court uses in examining limitations on 
expressions under Article 10 consists of two basic parts159. First, the 
Court asks whether there has been an interference with freedom of 
expression as stated in article 10(1)160. Then, if there is interference, the 
Court determines whether the interference is permissible161. A 
limitation is permissible only if it is “prescribed by law, [or is] one of 
the enumerated aims [of Article 10], and [is] necessary to a democratic 
society”162. In applying this test, the Court has not drawn a hard line 
between categories of what is an acceptable limitation and what is not, 
but it prefers to balance several factors on a case by case basis163. 
Notably, when the expression is one of core speech such as political 
speech, the category of permissible limitation will be narrowed164. 
Conversely, if the expression incites violence, the category of 
permissible limitations will be broadened165. 
Ultimately, the Court has created a confusing and unpredictable 
jurisprudence that nonetheless gives preferential treatment to 
protecting religious sensibilities and provides some support for the 
defamations of religions theory. Cerone points out that in Kokkinakis v. 
Greece the Court held that a State may legitimately limit conduct 
“judged incompatible with respect for the freedom of thought 
conscience, and religion of others”166. Additionally, in Otto-Preminger-
Institut v. Austria the Court held that seizure of a film by a State may be 
a permissible limitation on expression when the State has found that the 
film is an attack on religion167. Otto-Preminger provided the OIC with a 
strong precedent favoring implementation of defamation of religions 
principles. There, the court articulated a new “right of citizens not to be 
insulted in their religious feelings” through the expressions of others168. 
The court has tied this right to the right of religious freedom, but it has 
                                                          
159. Cerone, supra note 83, at 366. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. (citing Sürek v. Turkey (No. 1) 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 355; Jersild v. 
Denmark, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994); Lingens v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A) (1986)). 
163. Id. (citing Sürek, 1999-IV Eur Ct. H.R. at 382; Jersild 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 
24–25; Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25). 
164. See id. at 367. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 369 (citing Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 20 (1993)). 
167. Id. (citing Otto-Perminger Institut v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 17–18 
(1994)). 
168. Id. (quoting Otto-Perminger, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 18) (emphasis added)). 
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clearly stated that those exercising their freedom of religion cannot 
expect to be free from criticism; rather, believers should be prepared to 
“tolerate and accept the denial by others of their religious beliefs and 
even the propagation by others of doctrines hostile to their faith”169. 
This, it would seem, is the heart of religious freedom - inherent in the 
acceptance that each is free to believe and to exercise that belief is the 
acceptance that the beliefs of some will conflict with the beliefs of 
others. It follows that individual rights such as freedom of expression 
should be limited only to the extent absolutely necessary to prevent 
infringement on others‖ fundamental rights.  
Unfortunately, the international adjudicatory precedents on 
permissible limitations of expression are unclear and leave little surety 
as to which expressions are allowed and which will be limited. Perhaps 
more problematic is the lack of clarity as to why expressions may be 
limited or protected and the Court‖s apparent willingness to show a 
great amount of deference to the State even when it limits the 
expression of individuals who do not subscribe to majoritarian beliefs 
in their respective countries. For example, in more recent decisions, the 
Court has upheld a ban of a film deemed blasphemous and offensive to 
Christians by the British government, and it found a Turkish criminal 
blasphemy statute consistent with Article 10170. Cerone points out that 
in the continuing expansion of permissible limitations, the Court “may 
have lost its sense of the balance between [freedom of expression and 
freedom of religion]”171. 
Though these precedents lend ample support to the theory 
behind the defamation of religions resolutions, there is a danger in 
allowing a broadening of acceptable limitations in relation to the 
injured feelings of groups of adherents to particular religions. In 
                                                          
169. Id. at 371 (quoting Otto-Perminger, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 17–18)). 
170. Id. at 370–371 (citing Wingrove v. U.K. 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1960; İ.A. v. 
Turkey, App. No. 42571/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005)). 
171. Id. at 372. Cerone illustrates that the Court appears to be allowing limitations 
on expression when there has been no showing as to how those expressions limit or 
infringe on any specific right of another person. Additionally, the Court has failed to 
establish a clear link between its articulation of protection of religious feelings and the 
right to freedom of religion. Moreover, he notes that protection for religious feelings 
seems more appropriate when applied to vulnerable minorities rather than to 
majorities that may use defamation or blasphemy to keep the minority in check. 
Finally, Cerone notes that an inherent problem with blasphemy laws - often created 
and maintained as a protection of religious feelings - is that they focus on protecting 
the feelings of a group rather than regulating actions or behavior that would limit an 
individual‖s or the group‖s right to believe and practice religion as they choose. Id. at 
372. 
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continuing to accept these precedents and encouraging a broad 
category of limitations on freedom of expression, the human rights 
framework would be undermined by claims of offense from even 
majoritarian groups exercising their right to have their religious feelings 
insulated from injury. And thus majority groups could then oppress 
and discriminate against minority groups - even when those minority 
groups may be exercising their own religious beliefs through various 
expressive means like teaching, witnessing, or sharing their beliefs with 
others. 
 
5.c - Blasphemy, Incitement, and Hate Speech Laws and Their 
Enforcement  
 
Currently, a number of States prevent defamation of religions through 
blasphemy, incitement, or hate speech laws. Though not labeled as 
defamation statutes, these laws protect interests parallel to those that 
the OIC seeks to protect through promulgation of the defamation of 
religions theory, and they act as a sanctioned limitation on the right of 
expression. This Section first gives a brief sampling of such statutes and 
their enforcement in OIC member States, and then explores them in 
non-member States172. 
 
1. OIC Member States 
  
a. Afghanistan. Afghanistan takes a strong stance against blasphemy and 
even allows death sentences to those who violate its blasphemy laws. 
Journalist Sayed Perwiz Kambakhsh was sentenced to death after being 
found guilty of blasphemy173. Kambakhsh was arrested after fellow 
university students complained that he was mocking Islam and the 
Qur‖an and that he had circulated an article stating that Mohammad 
failed to enforce women‖s rights174. Reportedly, Kambakhsh confessed 
to blasphemy and upon his sentencing, the Afghan court threatened 
                                                          
172. Because of the difficulty in locating source materials in English from the 
member States, many of these examples are taken from news sources, and the legal 
reasoning of the courts is not always evident. However, this gives a good sampling of 
the possible abuses by governments under the OIC‖s defamation of religions theory. 
Many of these examples were first found at http://www.eclj.org/PDF/080623_Recent 
Defamation_of_Religion_Incidents_and_Cases.pdf as part of an appendix posted 
online by the European Centre for Law and Justice. 
173. U.S. Troubled by Afghan Journalist’s Death Sentence, REUTERS, Jan. 25, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSN2536506520080125.  
174. Id. 
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arrest for any who protested his punishment175. 
b. Iran. Like Afghanistan, Iran takes a hard stance against anything it 
considers blasphemy. Hashem Aghajari was a university professor in 
Iran when he gave a speech urging the listeners to question religious 
teachings including the words of the clerics, which he categorized as 
part of history rather than sacred writ176. After being found guilty of 
blasphemy, Aghajari was originally sentenced to death, but that 
sentence was reduced to “insulting religious values”177. He ultimately 
spent more than two years in prison before being released on 
$122,500.00 bail178. 
c. Pakistan. Pakistan, a leading member of the OIC and the country that 
first submitted a draft resolution on defamation of religions, clearly has 
a history of limiting the fundamental right of expression in order to 
protect the reputation and feelings of Islam, but not necessarily other 
religions. Pakistan‖s enforcement of blasphemy and defamation laws is 
extensive and well-documented. Punishment for insults against Islam 
can lead to fines, life imprisonment, or a death sentence179, though no 
one has been officially sentenced to death due to a lack of sufficient 
evidence in Pakistan‖s high courts180. The National Commission for 
Justice and Peace states that 537 people were charged with blasphemy 
during the time period from 1986  - when the blasphemy rule was first 
promulgated - through 2003, and sixteen of those accused were 
arbitrarily killed before they appeared in court, or were arrested181. 
Additionally, forty-one Christians were killed and ninety-one were 
                                                          
175. Afghan ‘Blasphemy’ Death Sentence, BBC NEWS, Jan. 23, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7204341.stm. 
176. Iran Frees Professor Set to Die for Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2004, § 1, at 12. 
177. Nazila Fathi, Iran Drops Death Penalty for Professor Guilty of Blasphemy, 
N.Y.TIMES, Jun. 29, 2004, at A8. 
178. Iran Frees Professor Set to Die for Speech, Supra note 171, at 12. 
179. Pakistan Penal Code, ch. XV, art. 295 (1986), available at http://www. 
punjabpolice.gov.pk/user_files/File/pakistan_penal_code_xlv_of_1860.pdf. 
180. Pakistan Shuts Nursing College After Blasphemy Scare, REUTERS, Jun. 4, 2007, 
http://in.reuters.com/ article/topNews/idINIndia-30139120070604 (last visited Nov. 
26, 2009). 
181. U.N. Comm‖n on Human Rights, Working Group on Minorities, 10th Sess. 
National Commission for Justice and Peace Letter to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 
(Mar. 1, 2004), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/minorities/docs/NCJP3a.doc 
Jagdeesh Kumar‖s co-workers allegedly found him guilty of blasphemy and 
sentenced him to die before enforcing the sentence themselves by beating the twenty-
year-old to death. Felix Qaiser, Mgr Saldanha Slams Murder of Hindu, Killed for Alleged 
Blasphemy, ASIANEWS.IT April 9, 2008, http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l= en&art 
=11971 (last visited Nov. 26, 2009). 
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injured in attacks against Christian (minority) churches182.  
The threat of punishment for blasphemy was enough to shut 
down a nursing school in Islamabad after allegations arose saying that 
verses from the Qur‖an posted on a wall had been defaced183. Teachers 
were suspended and students sent away for more than two weeks as a 
precaution184. Ultimately the trouble was ascribed to “invisible hands 
trying to ... create disharmony among Muslim and Christian 
students”185.  
As late as 2008, Robin Sardar, a Christian physician was charged 
with blasphemy in Hafizabad186. He was accused of making derogatory 
comments about Mohammed‖s beard and the Qur‖an187. A mob 
allegedly attacked his home and threatened his life and his family; 
Sardar was then taken into custody188. He faces the death penalty under 
Pakistan‖s penal code189. 
                                                          
182.  National Commission for Justice and Peace Letter to the U.N. Commission on 
Human Rights, supra note 176. 
183. Pakistan Shuts Nursing College After Blasphemy Scare, supra note ***. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Persecution.org, Muslims Want Christian Doctor Hanged Publicly for “Blasphemy” 
in Pakistan, May 14, 2008, http://www.persecution.org/suffering/ICCnews/newsde 
tail.php?newscode=7737. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. Pakistan Penal Code, at article 295-C (“Use of derogatory remarks, etc., in 
respect of the Holy Prophet: Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible 
representation or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, 
defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be 
punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine”). 
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d. Saudi Arabia. To a lesser degree than Pakistan, perhaps, Saudi Arabia 
still allows preservation of religious feelings to outweigh individual 
right to expression leading to extreme punishments merely for holding 
and expressing an idea. After police received complaints of a barber 
swearing at God in public, Sabri Bogday, age thirty, was arrested and 
sentenced to death after a closed trial in Jeddah190. He is not fluent in 
Arabic, and was not allowed to have a lawyer or a translator during his 
trial191.  
Mustafa Ibrahim was beheaded in 2007 after being convicted of 
desecrating the Qur‖an, sorcery, and adultery192. He was arrested under 
charges of placing the Qur‖an in washrooms193. At the time of his arrest 
there was no mention of adultery or sorcery194.  
Muhammad Al-Harbi, a Saudi high school teacher, was accused 
by his students and fellow teachers of mocking Islam while showing 
favoritism for Jews and Christians195. The students that accused him 
had recently failed a test administered by Al-Harbi and he had refused 
to allow them to retake the exam196. Additionally, Al-Harbi had 
allegedly advocated against terrorism - an action that offended the 
fundamentalist students in his classrooms197. Al-Harbi was arrested and 
sentenced to three years in prison and fifty lashes a week for fifteen 
weeks to be administered in the public market of Al-Bikeriya. At trial, 
Al-Harbi‖s lawyer was not acknowledged as such, and Al-Harbi was 
not allowed to question his accusers, nor call any witnesses198.  
e. Sudan. In the Sudan, the reach of these limitations of expressions 
extends severe punishment even to those who are unaware that their 
words or actions are in any way offensive, let alone defamatory or 
blasphemous. British School teacher, Gillian Gibbons, was arrested by 
                                                          
190. Amnesty International Doc. MDE 23/014/2008 (Apr. 23, 2008), http://www. 
amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE23/014/2008/en/224d8f74-115a-11dd-a414-
a101e24 af105/mde230142008eng.pdf. (last visited November 27, 2009). 
191. Id. 
192. Saudi Executes Egyptian for Practising ‘Witchcraft’, REUTERS, Nov. 2, 2007, 
http://africa.reuters.com/wire/news/usnL02434180. html (last visited Nov. 27, 
2009). 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. Ebtihal Mubarak, Teacher Charged with Mocking Religion Sentenced to Jail, ARAB 
NEWS, Nov. 14, 2005, http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1&section=0&article=73171 
(last visited Nov. 29, 2009). 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
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“men with big beards ... saying they wanted to kill her” and imprisoned 
for blasphemy after allowing her primary school class to name a teddy 
bear Mohammed199. She faced public lashing, or up to six months in jail 
if she was found guilty200. Within a month, she had been sentenced to 
prison but granted a presidential pardon, largely due to the 
intervention of two British Muslim parliamentarians201. 
In these brief examples from OIC member States, the problems 
inherent in the defamation of religions theory are clear. Because there is 
no line drawn between acceptable speech that may seem insulting or 
offensive speech that actually leads to discrimination or incitement 
against the targeted religion, and because the defamatory - in these 
cases blasphemous - nature of the expression is judged not by the action 
that results but by a per se standard (meaning if the prohibited 
expression happens it is blasphemous and thereby punishable) there is 
a broad range of “permissible” limitations on the freedom of expression 
in order to preserve the majority religion‖s freedom from religious 
injury. This effect can be seen in non-member States as well, including 
some Western States. 
 
2. Non-Member States  
  
a. India. The Indian government has demonstrated a willingness to ban 
written works rather than defend authors from serious personal threats. 
Well-known author Talima Nasreem was forced to flee her home 
country of Bangladesh after publication of her book, Shame, when 
Muslim extremists made her into the object of threats and unofficial 
death sentences. Nasreem initially resorted to heavy security but 
eventually went into exile. Officially, her government has banned her 
writings claiming they could “hurt the people‖s religious sentiments,” 
has stopped imports of magazines carrying her poems, and sentenced 
her to one year in prison for “writing derogatory comments about 
Islam.”202. Even these government actions, which do not rise to the 
threat of long-term imprisonment or death, still demonstrate a 
                                                          
199. Rob Crilly, The Blasphemous Teddy Bear, TIME, Nov. 26, 2007, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/ article/0,8599,1687755,00.html (last visited Nov. 
27, 2009). 
200. Id. 
201. Sam Dealey, The Teddy Bear Tumult’s Legacy, TIME, Dec. 3, 2007, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1690280,00.html?iid=sphere-inline 
-bottom (last visited Nov. 27, 2009). 
202. Talima Nasreen: Controvery’s Child, BBC NEWS, Nov. 23, 2007, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ south_asia/7108880.stm (last visited Nov. 27, 2009). 
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willingness to protect against religious defamations rather than other 
human rights.  
b. Italy. Even in Europe, States have demonstrated a willingness to 
protect the sentiments of a religion by prosecuting an author for written 
works deemed offensive. A well-known Italian author, Oriana Fallaci 
faced charges of “outrage” toward religion. The president of the 
Muslim Union of Italy accused her by saying the book in question was 
“offensive to Islam and Muslims,” and argued that it incited religious 
hatred203. Fallaci defended her writing, responding that she had 
“expressed [her] opinion through the written word through [her] 
books, that is all”204. She was living in the United States at the time and 
did not travel to Italy to appear in court205. She died just three months 
after the trial began. 
c. Canada. Canada has also rejected the United States‖ very broad 
protection of speech, favoring instead to allow criminal punishment for 
“hate propaganda,” including statements that tend to produce hateful 
feelings towards an identifiable group206. Additionally, Canada openly 
advocates limits to the right of expression207. In 1990, the Canadian 
Supreme Court upheld a criminal conviction of a teacher for 
“unlawfully promoting hatred against an identifiable group by 
communicating anti-Semitic statements to his students”208. The Court 
                                                          
203. Islam “Defamation” Trial Delayed, WORLD NET DAILY, June 14, 2006, 
http://www.wnd.com/news/ article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=50636 (last visited Nov. 27, 
2009). 
204. Italian Author to be Tried for Defaming Islam, THE JERUSALEM POST, Jun 12, 2006, 
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1150035834414&pagename=JPost%2FJP 
Article%2FShowFull, (last visited Nov. 27, 2009). 
205. Islam “Defamation” Trial Delayed, supra note 199. 
206. Canadian Criminal Code § 319, available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/C-
46/20091128/page-0.html?rp2=HOME&rp3=SI&rp1=hate&rp4= all&rp9= cs&rp10= 
L&rp13=50#idhit1 (making public statements that incite hatred against an identifiable 
group and which are likely to create a breach of the peace a criminal offense 
punishable by up to two years in prison; making any statement, other than those 
made in private conversation, that “willfully promotes hatred against any identifiable 
group” a criminal offense punishable by up to two years in prison; and providing a 
defense to such offenses if the person can establish the truth of the statements, if the 
statements were made in a good faith argument to assert a religious opinion or belief, 
if the person had reasonable ground to believe the statements were true and engaged 
in a discussion for the public benefit, or if the person was acting in good faith to point 
out matters “producing or tending to produce feelings of hatred toward an 
identifiable group in Canada”).  
207. Id. 
208. Regina v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, (Can.) available at 
http://csc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1990/1990scr3-697/1990scr3-697.pdf. 
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found that in his classes, the teacher had described Jews as 
“treacherous,” “communists,” “manipulative,” and “deceptive”209. The 
teacher also taught that Jews as a people were “sadistic,” “barbaric,” 
“money-loving,” and “power hungry”210. Chief Justice Brian Dickson 
noted that the “relationship between Canadian and American 
approaches to the ... protection of free expression”211 was important to 
the case, but concluded that, although “there is much to be learned 
from First Amendment jurisprudence [in the United States]”212,  
 
the international commitment to eradicate hate propaganda and, most 
importantly, the special role given equality and multiculturalism in the 
Canadian Constitution necessitate a departure from the view ... that the 
suppression of hate propaganda is incompatible with the guarantee of free 
expression213. 
 
Canadian Human Rights jurisprudence also supports the OIC‖s 
assertions that Islam needs singular protection against defamatory 
speech and that limitations on the right of expression are justified by a 
right not to be offended. Mohamed Elmsary, a Canadian Muslim and 
President of the Canadian Islamic Conference, brought suit against 
Mark Steyn claiming the publication of Steyn‖s work in a magazine was 
discriminatory, defamatory, and thereby prohibited by Canadian hate 
law statutes214. The Ontario Human Rights Commission did not 
proceed with the complaint because the Ontario Human Rights Code 
(the “OHRC”) does not grant the Commission jurisdiction over 
complaints about periodical content. However, the Commission did 
express concern that “Islamophobic attitudes are becoming more 
prevalent in society and Muslims are increasingly the target of 
intolerance” and that Steyn‖s writings as published were one example 
of this215. The Commission went on to “strongly condemn the targeting 
of Muslims, Arabs, South Asians and ... any racialized community by the 
media as being inconsistent with the [OHRC]”216. The Commission 
                                                          
209. Id. at 104. 
210. Id.  
211. Id. at 46. 
212. Id. at 51. 
213. Id.  
214. ONTARIO HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, COMPLAINT NO. LHOR-72JP9D 
http://www.steynonline.com/images/ macleans%20hr%20on%20elmasry.pdf. 
215. Ontario Human Rights Commission, COMMISSION STATEMENT CONCERNING 
ISSUES RAISED BY COMPLAINTS AGAINST MACLEAN‖S MAGAZINE, 
http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/resources/ news/statement (last visited Nov. 26, 2009). 
216. Id. (emphasis added). 
 Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it) 
aprile 2011                                                                                                              ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
 
 43 
ultimately recognized that freedom of expression is important to 
democracy, has social value and contributes to self-fulfillment and the 
pursuit of truth, but warned that  
 
with rights come responsibilities ... [T]he media has a 
responsibility to engage in fair and unbiased journalism. Bias 
includes . . . prejudicial attitudes towards individuals and groups . 
. . . Freedom of expression should be exercised through careful 
reporting and not used as a guise to target vulnerable groups and 
to further increase the marginalization or stigmatization in 
society217. 
 
Finally, the Commission reiterated that freedom of expression is 
a limited, rather than an absolute right, noting that one such limitation 
can be found in the Canadian Criminal Code provision on hate 
speech218.  
d. The United Kingdom. David Wilson was charged with distributing 
“written material which is threatening, abusive or insulting [with the 
intent] to stir up racial hatred”219 under sections 17 and 19 of the Public 
Order Act of 1986220. The lower tribunal found that within a 
community, Wilson had delivered leaflets that were threatening, likely 
to provoke fear, had racist overtones, and contained insulting, abusive, 
and inaccurate information that was an affront to the dignity of 
Muslims in the community and likely to cause a breach of the peace221. 
Wilson appealed his conviction, claiming that the tracts he distributed 
were political tracts not containing abusive material222. Additionally, he 
argued that section 17 of the Public Order Act focused on racial hatred 
and that such hatred had to be defined as against a group distinguished 
by color, race, nationality, ethnic, or national origins223. His request for 
appeal was refused and the court concluded that, as to the first 
question, Wilson failed to provide any evidence to refute the lower 
court‖s finding that the leaflet was threatening and so the initial finding 
was affirmed. As to Wilson‖s distinction between race and religion, the 
court sided with the lower court and held that the determination of 
                                                          
217. Id. 
218. Id.; see also Canadian Criminal Code, supra note 202.  
219. Wilson v. Procurator Fiscal, [2005] J.C. 97, available at 
http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotHC/2005/HCJAC_97.html. 
220. See Public Order Act, 1986, c.64 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx?activeTextDocId=2236942. 
221. Wilson, supra note 215 ¶ 4. 
222. Id. ¶ 12. 
223. Id.; see also Public Order Act, supra note 216.. 
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whether a group fits in the definition of the act is a question of fact and 
that, in this case, the lower tribunal found that the terms “Pakistani” 
and “Muslim” were commonly used interchangeably224. Thus, the 
leaflets “were abusive to persons defined by reference to national 
origins and also colour,” and were not a permissible expression under 
the Act225.  
e. The United States. The United States affords strong protection to 
speech, even speech that is hateful, offensive, or threatening. Critics 
believe that the United States is far too lenient in the amount and type 
of speech protected under constitutional standards. For example, as 
noted above, although incitement falls outside the category of protected 
speech, in order for speech to qualify as incitement under First 
Amendment jurisprudence, it must be both intended to incite or 
produce imminent lawless action and likely to incite or produce such an 
action226. This strong protection of speech was demonstrated when Saad 
Noah filed suit in the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of 
Virginia against AOL Time Warner asking for damages and injunctive 
relief because AOL failed to prohibit anti-Islamic comments and insults 
in online chat rooms227. In his complaint, Noah listed more than twenty 
pages of vulgar insults, disrespectful epithets, and violent threats he 
had suffered from other AOL members while visiting Islam and Qur‖an 
chat rooms228. The case was dismissed on the grounds that Noah, acting 
pro se, was not capable to represent other‖s claims in a class action suit. 
However, the court held that Noah‖s claim as to himself failed on all 
three legal theories Noah asserted. Importantly, Noah had no claim as 
to respecting hate speech, blasphemy, or defamation as no such laws 
exist in the United States. Neither did he have a First Amendment free 
speech claim because though the government in the United States is 
permitted to regulate incitement, it is not required to regulate 
incitement and in this case there was no attempt at such government 
regulation.  
The wide spectrum of current treatment of statements and 
actions that fall under the defamation of religions theory is evident even 
in the small sampling of instances above. From the liberal protection of 
                                                          
224. Wilson, supra note 215, ¶ 15. 
225. Id.  
226. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
227. See Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, (E.D. Va. 2004). 
228. Complaint, Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, (E.D. Va. 
2004), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aoltimewarner/noahaol8300 
1cmpt.pdf. 
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freedom of expression under the First Amendment to the liberal 
punishment of even inadvertent offenses against Islam in the OIC 
member States like Pakistan, the range of possible interpretations and 
application of defamation of religions is almost unlimited and endows 
state actors with an enormous power of regulation and enforcement.  
In addition to these examples, scholars and professionals have 
put forth numerous possible applications of defamation of religions, 
which pose increasing danger to the right of expression and increasing 
authority for tyrannical governments that would silence dissenters and 
for majoritarian religions that would infringe on others‖ rights to 
exercise their beliefs through witnessing and teaching. 
 
 
5.d - Possible Future Statutes and Enforcement Under Defamation of 
Religions Theory 
 
Adoption of the theory of defamation of religions as created by the OIC 
and proliferated in continuing U.N. Resolutions will allow enlarging 
the limitations on the right of expression—a discriminatory act in and 
of itself that is “the handmaiden of power [and] an instrument to assist 
in the attainment, preservation or continuance of . . . power, whether 
exercised by an individual, an institution, or a state. It is the extension 
of physical power into the realm of the mind and the spirit”229.  
As late as November of 2008, a meeting on the “Culture of 
Peace” requested by Saudi Arabia and hosted by the U.N. was criticized 
by the chair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 
as being  
 
“a cooperative effort between Muslim nations to reinforce the 
defamation of religions resolution they‖re sponsoring before the 
General Assembly ...” and “part of an attempt to legitimatize 
sharia law ... acting as a shield for countries that persecute any 
insult to Islam and intimidate Western nations that may attempt to 
criticize them”230. 
 
                                                          
229. Agnes Callamard, CONFERENCE ROOM PAPER, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, EXPERT SEMINAR ON THE LINKS BETWEEN 
ARTICLES 19 AND 20 OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
7 (quoting Michael Scammell, Censorship and its History—A Personal View, 1988 Article 
19 World Report 5). 
230. Jennifer Lawinski, FOX NEWS, Nov. 6, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/ 
0,2933,448104,00.html (last visited Jan. 2 2010). 
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This extension of power would reach new heights as States 
would be assuming responsibility to determine what type of expression 
qualifies as blasphemous or defamatory to religion as opposed to non-
violative expression. This is obviously problematic in countries with a 
recognized state religion because of the danger to the limits of the rights 
of minority religions, but this venture into defining the indefinable is 
also dangerous in pluralistic countries with mostly secular, democratic 
governments. For example, the Danish government would be forced to 
decide what, if anything, might be defamatory or insulting to Islam in 
the now infamous cartoons. This is a nearly impossible task and opens 
the door to major abuses of discretion by governments, limiting 
expression as it is determined to offend a religion or set of beliefs. 
Moreover, risks are high that would-be defamers will often 
commit their crimes unawares. For example, advertisements and 
marketing leading up to the 2010 World Cup has offended some 
Muslims. The Council of Muslim Theologians of South Africa stated 
that Souvenir soccer balls with images of the flags of Saudi Arabia, Iran, 
and Iraq, which include Islamic statements that Muslims hold as sacred, 
“[have] the potential of offending adherents of the Islamic faith”231. 
Though it is possible that no offense was intended or even foreseen, this 
act could be made punishable under the broad concept of defamation of 
religions. The U.N. must look for a more legitimate way to sensitively 
address the injustices suffered by multiple religious adherents and 
encourage actions to create an atmosphere of dialogue with respect and 
thus protect the freedom of expression as well as the freedom to believe 
and practice religion. 
 
 
6 - Alternatives to Defamation of Religions in the U.N. Resolutions 
 
Attempts to define an alternative to the OIC resolutions on defamation 
of religions require a careful look at the interests to be balanced. 
Namely, the right to hold and express an opinion on one side balanced 
against the desire to encourage a respectful dialogue and eliminate 
discriminatory expressions and action on the other. The appropriate 
standard should include a notion of incitement that is considerably 
broader than the current U.S. standard but that is narrow enough to 
allow for some regulation, possibly even criminalization. However, the 
                                                          
231. Organisation of the Islamic Conference, Cultural and Social Affairs 
Department OIC Islamophobia Observatory, MONTHLY BULLETIN – Nov. 2008 at 1(c), 
http://www.oic-oci.org/english/article/MB_Nov-08.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2010). 
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standard cannot be so broad as to eliminate robust discussion that 
sometimes shocks and offends.  
Some assert that the United States‖ First Amendment 
jurisprudence is the proper model and should be summarily adopted 
by the international legal community232. This approach is overly 
simplistic, ignores the pluralistic nature of international law, and is 
overtly imperialistic. It is short-sighted and fails to acknowledge 
compelling interests in preventing massacres like the Holocaust or 
Rwanda, which many scholars determine were rooted first in hateful or 
inciting speech233. As noted, above, no other country had embraced the 
broad protections that the United States provides pursuant to its First 
Amendment jurisprudence. Assertions, then, that this should be 
adopted without question as the international standard for freedom of 
expression appear inherently flawed. At the same time, the broad 
protections against defamation of religions proposed by the OIC and its 
member states impermissibly infringe on the basic human right of 
freedom to hold autonomous opinions and freedom to express those 
opinions as well as the freedom to exercise religious mandates to 
witness one‖s beliefs to others. 
In response to the conflict between these important interests, the 
U.N. should follow the recommendation made by the Special 
Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, 
xenophobia and related intolerance and move away from the 
“sociological notion of the defamation of religions” and towards the 
established “human rights concept of incitement to racial and religious 
hatred”234 thus coming closer to an appropriate balance between 
freedom of expression and the need to eliminate hate speech235. Any 
permissible limitations under Article 19 of the ICCPR “should be clearly 
and narrowly defined” so as to be the “least intrusive means” of 
limiting expression and should not be allowed to justify prior 
                                                          
232. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 136; Groves, supra note 38. 
233. See, e.g., William A. Schabas, Hate Speech in Rwanda: The Road to Genocide, 46 
MCGILL L.J. 144 (2000) (“Mugesera himself did not commit genocide, although his 
speech sparked a series of atrocities directed against Tutsi in the Gisenyi region of the 
country ... [H]is remarks constituted direct and public incitement to commit genocide. 
Mugesera‖s speech has been cited ... as one of the defining moments in the buildup to 
genocide. The road to genocide in Rwanda was paved with hate speech”). 
234. See UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, Racism, Racial Discrimination, 
Xenophobia and Related Forms of Intolerance: Follow-up to and Implementation of 
the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action¶ 5, (Jul. 1, 2009), 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/12session/A-HRC-12-38_E 
.pdf (hereinafter S.R. Report 2009). 
235. Id. ¶ 19. 
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censorship on speech236. thus encouraging a robust debate within the 
community. This “free flow of information [will increase] the capacity 
of all to participate” in the nation or community and contribute to the 
understanding of law and policy therein237. Though this standard may 
conflict with Islamic religious requirements, it is not equitable that one 
group should have basic rights categorically enforced at the expense of 
others‖ equally fundamental human rights. In order for all to enjoy and 
exercise such basic rights, all must endure occasional encroachments by 
those who do not share their beliefs until such encroachments reach a 
level of actual incitement to violence. 
Rather than encouraging the vague defamation of religions 
theory as asserted by the OIC, thereby allowing States broad limitation 
on expression, the U.N. should encourage permissible limitations on 
speech that can include regulation and even criminalization for 
incitement or for hate speech that are sufficiently narrow. Ideally, 
statutory regulations would provide protection for individuals rather 
than for ideas and would lean towards punishing actions rather than 
expressions of ideas or opinions. Thus, an expression may seem 
offensive to the Islamic religion as a whole, but only an individual who 
experiences the effects of violence or discrimination or who would 
suffer the effects of violence or discrimination were it carried out could 
make a claim. This would do away with the shapeless victim or plaintiff 
of “a religion.” For example, a statute may require that the speaker or 
publisher intend that his or her expression will lead to discriminatory 
actions or exclusions of another group based on some type of 
classification—be it racial, ethnic, or religious. Another way to limit the 
limitations on expression might be to provide that the audience has to 
demonstrate intent to act on the inciting expression. Obviously, there 
will be some balancing involved regardless of the standard adopted 
because determining a hard-line rule for what type of speech incites 
hatred or discrimination is a nearly impossible task without considering 
the speaker, the audience, and the circumstances of the speech or 
                                                          
236. UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, Report OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR 
on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression 
¶65, (March 7, 2008), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/7ses 
sion/A-HRC-7-14.pdf. 
237. Agnes Callamard, Conference Room Paper #2, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Expert Meeting on the Links Between 
Articles 19 and 20 of the ICCPR: Freedom of Expression and Advocacy of Religious 
Hatred that Constitutes Incitement to Discrimination, Hostility or Violence,(Oct. 2, 
2008), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/opinion/articles1920_iccpr/experts_ 
papers.htm. 
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speech act. However, with good principles and relying on established 
international legal foundations, a narrower protection can be enforced 
that will avoid indiscriminate infringement of the essential freedom to 
hold and express autonomous ideas and opinions.  
Additionally, the U.N. must encourage that such statutes be 
designed to protect all religions from expressions that incite hatred or 
violence regardless of whether countries embrace a state religion and 
regardless of what that state religion is. States can thereby avoid 
favoring one group or sect over another and allow all to practice and 
contribute equally. Thus, countries will most likely encourage 
discussion in a respectful and civil atmosphere while avoiding “the 
peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion” which could 
ultimately lead to “the [lost] opportunity of exchanging error for truth 
[or] the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by 
its collision with error”238. 
 
 
7 - Conclusion 
 
The legal theory of “Defamation of Religions” is a vague, overbroad 
principle designed to provide protection specifically for Islam and to 
allow Islamic nations to impermissibly limit the expressions of others 
within their countries. The U.N. should not continue to adopt the 
resolutions on defamation of religions as they encourage overbroad 
statutes giving governments the power to arbitrarily decide what 
constitutes defamation and should therefore be regulated or even 
criminalized. The negative effects of such broad-reaching statues have 
already been demonstrated in multiple countries.  
Rather than encourage the promulgation of defamation of 
religions legislation, the U.N. must use established international law 
principles and guidelines of incitement to discrimination and violence 
to encourage States to enforce religious rights, limit discrimination, and 
create an atmosphere of mutual respect through a suitably narrow 
notion of incitement that will allow some regulation and even 
criminalization, but that will continue to allow robust discussion that 
sometimes shocks and offends.  
The motives behind the promulgation of the defamation of 
religions theory likely include an honest desire to prevent the type of 
discriminatory treatment Muslims have endured in multiple areas of 
                                                          
238. John Stuart Mill, ON LIBERTY (1869), reprinted in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER 
ESSAYS, at 21 (Oxford Univ. Press 1998). 
 Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it) 
aprile 2011                                                                                                              ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
 
 50 
the world. However, sufficient protection can be afforded to individuals 
without embracing a doctrine that is so broad it substantially threatens 
the human right of freedom of expressions. It is imperialistic and 
inappropriate to suggest that the international legal community should 
merely adopt U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence as the model for the 
U.N. guidance on the matter. There may be broader impositions on 
expressions internationally than would be permissible in the United 
States, but limitations should be based on protecting individuals rather 
than religions and should be narrowly defined to avoid overbroad 
legislation that could be nothing more than a tool for governments with 
state religions to quash ideas with which they do not agree. Only then 
will we be able  
 
“[t]o maintain international peace and security, ... [t]o develop 
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, ... [t]o achieve 
international co-operation in solving international problems ... 
[and to] promot[e] and encourag[e]respect for human rights and 
for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, 
sex, language, or religion”239. 
                                                          
239. U.N. Charter art. 1, paras. 1–3. 
